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INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983' (the "New BCA")
2
became effective July 1, 1984, replacing The Business Corporation Act
(the "Old BCA"). 3 This represents the first comprehensive revision of
the Illinois general business corporation statutory law since the Old BCA
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
1.01-16.10 (Supp. 1984)[hereinafter cited as New BCA, §§ 1.0116.10].
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
157.1-157.166 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Old BCA, §§ 1-166].
3. The anomaly of a "1983" suffix to the name of an act that became effective in mid-1984
appears to be due to the expectation of a 1983 effective date when House Bill 2281, providing for the
creation of the New BCA and the repeal of the Old BCA, was introduced in the Illinois General
Assembly on April 20, 1983. The press of other matters delayed passage of the bill. Business Act on
Hold; Other Bills Win Passage, CHi. B. A.

COMMUNICATOR,

Aug. 1983, at 8 [hereinafter cited as

ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION

ACT

became effective in 1933. Such action by a major commercial-industrial
state is important not only for the large number of corporations that are
subject to the Illinois law and their attorneys, but also for other states
that may consider the Illinois law as a possible pattern for their general
business corporation statutes.
Drafted by the Illinois Secretary of State's specially-appointed Advisory Committee to Revise the Illinois Business Corporation Act (the
"Advisory Committee"), the New BCA changes an estimated 80% of the
sections of the Old BCA. 4 Given the extent of the changes, a definitive
evaluation of the New BCA will require a long period of broad public
exposure to its provisions. Even at this early stage, however, certain positive and negative aspects of the change-over to the New BCA are apparent, as is the need for more work on the New BCA.
II.

SOME POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE NEW

BCA

On the positive side, some substantive changes in the Old BCA that
were needed-in many cases for a long time-have been made. Counted
as examples of this are provisions (i) allowing refunds of fees and
franchise taxes erroneously paid (New BCA section 1. 17); (ii) increasing
to 60 days (from 40) the maximum notice period for shareholders' meetings (New BCA section 7.15); (iii) eliminating the requirement in Old
BCA section 37 for recording meetings of a board or committee attended
by means of conference telephone (New BCA section 8.15(d));
(iv) allowing boards of directors to have any number of committees (New
BCA section 8.40) instead of the Old BCA allowance of only an executive committee; (v) providing for "cash-out" mergers and otherwise
broadening the types of consideration that may be exchanged for shares
in a merger (New BCA section 11.05(c)); and (vi) more forcefully forbidding the application of Illinois law to the internal affairs of foreign corporations qualified in the state (New BCA section 13.10) in an effort to
overcome case precedent to the contrary under the Old BCA.
Also on the positive side are a number of other changes which, while
not properly labelled as "needed," are useful in that they make the New
BCA more flexible than the Old BCA. Examples of such changes are
provisions (i) permitting correction of errors in documents filed with the
Illinois Secretary of State (New BCA section 1.15); (ii) eliminating the
Business Act on Hold]. The bill ultimately was passed by the General Assembly in November, 1983,
and signed into law by the governor on January 4, 1984, to become effective on July 1, 1984.
4. Advisory Committee, Overview of the Illinois Business CorporationAct of 1983, 64 CHI. B.
REC. 344, 346 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee, Overview].
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requirement that there be at least one class or series of shares with voting
rights on all matters (New BCA section 6.05); (iii) broadening the powers of boards of directors to determine the types and amounts of consideration that will be full payment for shares to be issued (New BCA
sections 6.25 and 6.30); (iv) permitting uncertificated shares (New BCA
section 6.35); (v) eliminating the unanimity requirement for action taken
by shareholders by written consent (New BCA section 7.10);
(vi) permitting classified boards of directors, although limited to boards
of six or more members (New BCA section 8.10(e)); and (vii) creating a
mandatory share exchange, with an approving vote by shareholders, as a
method of corporate acquisition (New BCA section 11.10).
More questionable is the benefit that may result from the changes in
format employed in the New BCA. To some extent the choice of format
is always arbitrary because any format sacrifices some advantages to gain
others. 5 In this case, intertwining numerous substantive changes with
extensive changes in format makes it more difficult to identify, and gain
an accurate and complete understanding of, the substantive changes that
have been made. The near-term consequence is to substantially increase
6
the cost and other burdens of the transition to the new law.
While cost and other burdens of transition may be a necessary part
of any major change, the following are several negative aspects of the
changeover to the New BCA that could have been avoided:
First, the July 1, 1984 effective date allowed too little lead time.
There was no pressing public need that made the New BCA an urgent
matter. 7 A January 1, 1985 effective date, for example, would have
5. One of the format changes is to combine in a single section or series of sections the treatment of particular topics for both domestic and foreign corporations instead of using separate but
parallel sections for domestic and foreign corporations as was done in the Old BCA. For example,
matters relating to corporate and assumed names for domestic and foreign corporations are dealt
with on a combined basis in New BCA §§ 4.05 - 4.20, avoiding the redundancy of language required
by the separate but parallel provisions used in the Old BCA. Lost, however, is a certain convenience
of finding most of the provisions relating to foreign corporations in a segregated portion of the Old
BCA, rather than scattered as is true of the New BCA.
6. The true cost of the changeover to the New BCA probably cannot be measured. However,
if the cost of time spent by corporate personnel and the practicing bar to educate themselves about
the New BCA averages only $100 for each of the approximately 185,000 corporations that were
subject to the Old BCA, that time component of the transition cost alone would total $18,500,000.
7. The belief that an early effective date was needed may be derived from the claim that the
New BCA "should enhance economic development in Illinois by making incorporation in Illinois
and remaining an Illinois corporation more attractive." See Kjellenberg, 1983 Illinois Business CorporationAct Nears Completion, 28 ILL. ST. B. A. CORP. & SEC. 1, 2 (Oct. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Kjellenberg, Act Nears Completion]; see also Thompson Signs Corp. Bill at CBA Lunch, CHI. B. A.
COMMUNICATOR, Feb. 1984, at 7. However, it is more reasonable to expect that business considerations, rather than the choice of domiciliary law, will dictate the extent of economic development, i.e.,
the location and retention of business in Illinois. Businesses desiring an Illinois location which do
not prefer the Illinois corporate law have always had the choice of incorporating under another
state's law, usually the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
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allowed more time for a thorough advance education for those affected, thereby smoothing the transition. The longer period of general
public exposure prior to the effective date also would have provided
more time to verify that there are no serious deficiencies in the New
BCA adversely affecting the some 185,000 corporations that
mandatorily became subject to its provisions when it took effect. 8
Second, certainty as to the meaning of the provisions of the New
BCA is important to the public interest, and the need for improvement
in that regard is obvious in various instances. To promote understanding of the new provisions and to minimize the need for judicial interpretation, as extensive a background commentary as is reasonably
possible should be made publicly available. The Advisory Committee's February 1984 Official Comments on the New BCA 9 (the "Official Comments") are helpful but not sufficiently detailed or thorough.
Particularly needed is a comprehensive attribution of the sources from
which the New BCA changes were derived. Depending upon their
quality, the minutes of the meetings of the Advisory Committee might
be published as an alternative to the preparation of a more extensive
official commentary although it probably would be helpful to the public, in any event, to publish those minutes as an additional reference
source.
Third, even though the Advisory Committee devoted substantial
time to the preparation of the New BCA' ° and "[tihe 175-member
Corporation Law Committee [of The Chicago Bar Association] painstakingly examined and approved each revision,"II the blunt fact is that
in splicing provisions taken from different sources into a comprehensive act, certain errors and peculiarities resulted that deserve further
attention. An example of this, discussed subsequently herein, is the
change in the corporate capital concept which has the incidental (and
no doubt unintended) consequence of allowing at leastt 2some corporations to reduce their Illinois franchise tax obligations.
§§ 101-398 (1983)) [hereinafter the "Delaware General Corporation Law"], and qualifying to do
business in Illinois, at a relatively modest additional total cost. Further, those making a careful
analysis of the factors affecting the choice will conclude that most businesses that would have chosen
the Delaware General Corporation Law as the domiciliary law while the Old BCA was in effect still
have compelling reasons to do so with the New BCA in effect.
8. A period of general public exposure was provided by the procedure for the comprehensive
revision of the Model Business Corporation Act, tentatively entitled 1983 Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, undertaken by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. A March 1983 Exposure Draft was
published "for the sole purpose of study, criticism, and comment." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
(Tent. Draft, March 1983)[hereinafter cited as ABA Exposure Draft]. The Committee on Corporate
Laws committed to review all comments received before August 31, 1983, and, to the extent possible, all comments received thereafter, in preparing its final draft.
9. 2 ILL. BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. app. F (Supp. 1984)[hereinafter cited as Official
Comments].
10. See Advisory Committee, Overview, supra note 4, at 344-46; Kjellenberg, Act Nears Completion, supra note 7, at 1.
11. Business Act on Hold, supra note 3, at 8.
12. Another example is the failure to properly interrelate New BCA §§ 8.65(a)(2) and 12.75.
New BCA § 8.65(a)(2) provides that directors of a dissolved corporation may be held liable for
failure "to take reasonable steps to cause the notice required by [New BCA] Section 12.75 ... to be
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Fourth, the New BCA contains some important public policy
changes that deserved to be singled out for broad public exposure and
comment before enactment. For example, New BCA section 8.60 concerning directors' conflicts of interest reverses, without explanation, a
policy only recently adopted in the 1981 amendments to the Old BCA.
This reversal, moreover, has possible adverse consequences for the indemnification by corporations of their directors under New BCA section 8.75.13
Fifth, assuming that the purpose of the New BCA is to modernize
and streamline the Illinois general business corporation statutory
law,' 4 the effort in that regard falls short in various instances. The
New BCA does make a number of improvements suited to that purpose, but given the cost and other burdens of transition to the New
BCA, it is disappointing that a more comprehensive modernization
and streamlining has not been achieved.
III.

SOME EXAMPLES WHERE MORE WORK IS NEEDED

The foregoing five points are illustrated in the analysis of the New
BCA which follows. The primary purpose of the analysis is to point out
examples where it is apparent that more work is needed.
A.

1.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Execution, Filing and Recording

New BCA section 1.10 places in one section a uniform standard for
most of the execution, filing and recording requirements for documents
to be filed with the Illinois Secretary of State. Although this is a major
given to any known creditor of such corporation" (emphasis added). New BCA § 8.65(a)(2) in effect
carries forward, with minor substantive changes, the provisions of Old BCA § 42.6. However, Old
BCA § 42.6 related to Old BCA § 79(a) which required a corporation to notify its known creditors
in the case of a voluntary dissolution. Unlike Old BCA § 79(a), New BCA § 12.75 permits, but does
not require, any notice to be given to known creditors of a dissolved corporation. Does this render
New BCA § 8.65(a)(2) meaningless? If not, in what situation does New BCA § 8.65(a)(2) apply?
13. See infra pp. 36-38 ("Director Conflicts of Interest").
14. While the New BCA reasonably should be analyzed in terms of its overall purpose, the task
is made difficult by the published descriptions of that purpose. For example, one reason for the New
BCA advanced by the Advisory Committee in its Introduction to Illinois Business CorporationAct of
1983 which accompanies the copy of the New BCA published by the Secretary of State [hereinafter
cited as Advisory Committee's Introduction] is that the Old BCA "has hindered economic development in Illinois." As already indicated, "economic development" is not a plausible purpose. See
supra note 7. Another reason for the New BCA is described in the Advisory Committee's Introduction as follows:
The need to modernize the [Old BCA] is also the result of a number of significant developments during the past 50 years, such as substantial revisions of the Internal Revenue Code
and the taxation of corporations, the development of a "federal corporate law," and recent
developments by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Law Institute in the area of corporate governance.
However, few of the changes made by the New BCA relate to those developments. The most likely
reason for the New BCA appears to be simply to make the Illinois statutory law more flexible and
accommodating to the wide range of circumstances encountered in modern corporate practice.
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change in format from the Old BCA, in which many of those requirements were separately stated in different sections for each of the documents to be filed, only minor substantive changes are made. On the
substantive side, for example, is the change that requires only the original
to be manually signed when documents are to be filed in duplicate or
triplicate. The copies may be carbon or photo copies of the signed original, rather than having all copies manually signed as was required by the
Old BCA.
Overall, New BCA section 1.10 falls short of the modernizing and
streamlining objectives. The typical, outdated execution requirement in
the Old BCA' 5 that a filed document be signed by the president or a vicepresident and the secretary or an assistant secretary has been made the
standard in the New BCA. New BCA section 1.10(b)(2)(i) does add an
alternative for signatures "by such officers as may be duly authorized to
exercise the duties, respectively, ordinarily exercised by the president or
vice-president and by the secretary or assistant secretary." The apparent
purpose of this alternative is not to add flexibility but to correlate with
New BCA section 8.50 which allows a corporation to have such officers,
with such titles, as it may determine, instead of the Old BCA section 43
requirement that a corporation had to have at least certain specified officers, including a president and a secretary. Taken literally, New BCA
section 1.10(b)(2)(i) will permit execution by a chairman or vice chairman of the board only if those officers are authorized to carry out the
overall functions of a president, and not just the president's duties of
executing documents. This is far more restrictive than Delaware General
Corporation Law section 103(a) (from which New BCA section 1.10(b)
appears to be derived) which specifically authorizes, without any limita6
tion, execution by a chairman or vice chairman.1
A more flexible and modern execution provision is contained in the
American Bar Association's March 1983 Exposure Draft of the 1983 Revised Model Business Corporation Act 17 (the "ABA Exposure Draft"),
15. See, e.g., Old BCA, §§ 12, 15, 55, 58, 58a, 59 & 60a.
16. The signature formula in New BCA § 1.10(b)(l) and (2) is basically a copy of Delaware
General Corporation Law § 103(a)(1) and (2) except that the authority granted by the Delaware law
for a chairman or vice chairman of the board to sign is eliminated in the New BCA version. Another variation from the Delaware Law occurs in clauses (iii) and (iv) of New BCA § 1.10(b)(2)
which provide for execution of filed documents by shareholders. Clause (iii) tracks Delaware Law
§ 103(a)(2)(iii) precisely, allowing "holders of record, or such of them as may be designated by the
holders of recordof a majority of all outstanding shares" (emphasis added) to sign when there are no
directors or officers. But clause (iv) of New BCA § 1.10(b)(2), addressing the case where there are
directors or officers, varies from Delaware Law § 103(a)(2)(iv) by omitting the phrase "of record" so
that it simply permits a document to be signed "[bly the holders of all outstanding shares." Was a
different meaning intended in clause (iv) by failing to require that the holders be of record?
17. See supra note 8.
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section 1.20(f), which permits execution by any officer, leaving it to the
filing corporation to determine which officers are authorized to sign. The
ABA Exposure Draft also eliminates, while the New BCA continues, the
archaic requirement that two officers sign a filed document. In addition,
the New BCA does not eliminate the requirement that copies of filed
documents and certificates issued by the Secretary of State be recorded in
the county where a corporation maintains its registered office. If any
present-day need is served by such recording, isn't it time that an alternative be developed so that the burden and expense of recording can be
eliminated?
2.

Correction of Errors

Unlike the Old BCA, which had no such procedure, New BCA section 1.15 allows correction of errors in documents filed under the New
BCA with the Secretary of State. Correction may be made at any time
and will be effective retroactively to the date the document being corrected was filed. Of course, rights and liabilities arising from reliance on
the error prior to the corrective filing cannot be extinguished by the correction (New BCA section 1.15(e)(3)).
Delaware for some time has had a procedure for correcting errors in
filed documents."' ABA Exposure Draft section 1.24, contains a similar
provision. Both allow correction only of mechanical errors-factual misstatements and faulty execution.
New BCA section 1.15(a) allows the same corrections, but goes further by permitting correction of "any other error or defect." Exactly
what is intended by the added language in the New BCA is not clear. A
detailed explanation by the Advisory Committee might have provided
needed guidance, but no such explanation appears in the Advisory Committee's Official Comments. In the absence of such explanation, the literal meaning appears to be to permit retroactive amendments of
documents to correct errors of judgment.' 9
A literal interpretation leads to some interesting possibilities. For
example, can the election by a corporation in its articles of incorporation
filed under the New BCA to have the Illinois franchise tax based on all,
18. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 103(f (1983).
19. The argument that retroactive amendment is permitted is further supported by the provision in New BCA § 1.15(e)(1) that a statement of correction may not make "any change or amendment of articles" that could not have been lawfully made "at the time of filing the instrument being
corrected" (emphasis added). An argument against retroactive amendment likely would be based on
New BCA § 1.15(e)(2), which says that a statement of correction may not -[tlake the place of any
document ... otherwise required to be filed." It would have been helpful if the Official Comments
had explained the meaning of New BCA § 1.15(e)(2) which is not fully apparent from its text.
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or a certain portion, of its paid-in capital be retroactively changed to
reduce the basis for such tax if subsequent events prove the initial judgment to have been unwise? If a corporation reports in its articles of incorporation filed under the New BCA that it will raise, say, $100,000 of
paid-in capital without further report and subsequently fails to raise that
amount, can it file a statement of correction to retroactively reduce that
figure, thereby establishing grounds for a refund of at least a part of its
initial Illinois franchise tax payment? If such errors of judgment, determined from postfiling events, can be corrected under section 1.15, it is
not clear what provision of the New BCA prevents retroactive organic
changes from also being made under the section. For example, may a
corporation which initially had authorized 10,000 shares and subsequently finds it could use 100,000, file under section 1.15 to make that
change, rather than resort to the procedure for amending its articles of
incorporation which requires shareholders' approval?
3.

Refunds

In the case of illegal or erroneous assessments or overpayments of
the Illinois license fee, franchise tax, 20 penalties or other charges, New
BCA section 1.17 provides for correction of the assessments and refunds
of the overpayments if a petition therefor is filed within a three year limitation period. There was no counterpart to this provision in the Old
BCA.
Does the right to a refund apply to overpayments under the Old
BCA as well as the New BCA? In the absence of guidance by the Advisory Committee as to what was intended, an argument can be made that
refunds should be available in some instances for overpayments under
the Old BCA if applied for within the three year limitation period. The
refund right under New BCA section 1.17 is not expressly limited to
overpayments made under the New BCA, while in contrast the right to
correct an error in a filed document is limited by New BCA section
1.15(a) to documents filed under the New BCA. However, under New
BCA section 1.17(a)(3), a refund due because of an error in a filed document is conditioned upon a statement of correction of that error being
filed under New BCA section 1.15. Consequently, at most a refund of an
overpayment under the Old BCA could be claimed only if it is not based
on an error in a document filed under the Old BCA. Even then, the
20. New BCA § 1.17 refers simply to "tax" which is not a defined term and which literally
would not be limited to the Illinois corporate franchise tax. However, because the only tax administered by the Illinois Secretary of State is the state's corporate franchise tax, the word "tax" in section
1.17 reasonably should be construed to mean only that tax.
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argument against refund no doubt would claim an intent (not expressed
in New BCA section 1.17) to bar such refunds because payments under
the Old BCA were final and no refunds should be permitted when the
law in effect at the time of overpayment did not permit refunds.
4.

Definitions

Most of the changes in defined terms in New BCA section 1.80 were
made to correlate with changes elsewhere in the Act. An example is the
replacement of the definitions of "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus"
in Old BCA sections 2.11 and 2.12 with a single definition of "paid-in
capital" in New BCA section 1.800). This is tied to changes elsewhere in
the New BCA section 1.800). This is tied to changes elsewhere in the
New BCA which eliminate the par value concept and the restrictions
that existed in the Old BCA on the use of stated capital and paid-in sur21
plus for dividends and purchases by an issuer of its shares.
However, one peculiarity arises from the continued use in New
BCA section 1.80(a) of the Old BCA definition of "corporation" to refer
only to a domestic corporation. Due no doubt to the format change in
the New BCA which combines into a single section or series of sections
the treatment of each topic common to both domestic and foreign corporations, the New BCA lapses in at least one instance (New BCA section
4.20 concerning change or cancellation of an assumed name) into the use
of "corporation" as if the word means a foreign as well as a domestic
corporation. The courts and those using the New BCA will have to interpret "corporation" to include a foreign corporation where the assigned definition would produce an apparently unintended result.
B.
1.

FORMATION OF CORPORATIONS

Incorporators

New BCA section 2.05 changes Old BCA section 46 only by reducing to 18 (from 21) the minimum age at which a natural person may act
as an incorporator. Thus, the restrictive rule in Old BCA section 46 that
only natural persons and corporations may act as incorporators is continued in New BCA section 2.05. This stands in contrast to the more flexible, modern provisions for incorporators in Delaware General
Corporation Law section 101 ("[a]ny person, partnership, association or
corporation") and in the ABA Exposure Draft, sections 1.40(9), 1.40(15)
and 2.01 (any "individual" or "entity").
21. See infra pp. 38-42 ("Distributions").
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Organization of Corporation

In contrast to Old BCA section 51, which provided only one set of
steps for corporate action to complete the organization of a corporation
after its incorporation, the New BCA provides three alternatives. Which
New BCA alternative applies turns primarily on whether the initial directors are named in the articles of incorporation (as permitted by New
BCA section 2.10(b)(1)) and, secondarily, on whether there are preorganization subscribers, as follows:
1. If the initial directors are named in the articles of incorporation, the board of directors attends to organizational matters, electing
officers, adopting by-laws and taking other necessary action (New
BCA section 2.20(c)). However, this alternative is compatible with a
provision in the articles of incorporation reserving the by-law power
exclusively to the shareholders (as permitted by New BCA section
2.25) only if there are preorganization subscribers. Because preorganization subscribers are deemed to be shareholders under New BCA
section 6.20 (as was true under Old BCA section 16), they can adopt
saving the corporation from the
by-laws under such circumstances,
22
problems of having no by-laws.
2. If the initial directors are not named in the articles of incorporation and if there are preorganization subscribers, the procedure is the
same as under Old BCA section 51. In such event, the preorganization
subscribers elect the initial directors and may (or must, if the by-law
power is reserved exclusively to the shareholders in the articles of incorporation) adopt by-laws, after which the board of directors elects
officers and takes the remaining action needed to complete the organization of the corporation (New BCA section 2.20(b)).
3. If the initial directors are not named in the articles of incorporation and if there are no preorganization subscribers, the incorporators elect the initial directors, who then take the remaining action
needed to complete the organization of the corporation (New BCA
section 2.20(a)). This alternative is not compatible with a reservation
of the by-law power exclusively to the shareholders in the articles of
incorporation.
Although the New BCA makes the alternatives for completing the
organization of a corporation more like those under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the evolution falls short of being finished. The
New BCA still lacks some of the Delaware Law's flexibility. As a minor
nuisance, the New BCA has no provision comparable to Delaware General Corporation Law section 108(c) for incorporators to act by written
consent in lieu of holding a meeting. Also, under Delaware General Corporation Law section 107, until the initial directors are named, the cor22. Without by-laws, for example, a corporation apparently could not have officers because
under New BCA § 8.50 "[a] corporation shall have such officers as shall be provided in the by-laws."
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poration nevertheless has a governing body because the incorporators
may "manage the affairs of the corporation" in addition to doing
"whatever is necessary and proper to perfect the organization of the corporation, including the adoption of the original by-laws . . . and the

election of directors." Under the New BCA, the incorporators may do
no more than elect the initial directors and then only if there are no
preorganization subscribers. Finally, Delaware General Corporation
Law section 109 avoids the need for preorganization subscribers that exists under the New BCA when the articles of incorporation reserve the
by-law power exclusively to the shareholders. The by-law power is reserved to the shareholders under the Delaware Law, but that reservation
is not operative until the corporation has received some payment for at
least some of its stock; prior to that time the directors or incorporators
have the power to adopt by-laws.
3. By-Laws
New BCA section 2.25 makes a major substantive change in the
power to adopt and amend by-laws. Old BCA section 25 vested that
power in the directors unless reserved to the shareholders in the articles
of incorporation. Under New BCA section 2.25, the power is vested in
the shareholders as well as the board of directors, unless reserved solely
to the shareholders in the articles of incorporation. In other words,
shareholders always have by-law power which cannot be denied, while
the board of directors also will have by-law power if not denied that
power by the articles of incorporation. Such sharing of the by-law power
is similar to the result usually achieved under Delaware General Corporation Law section 109. However, New BCA section 2.25 goes further
by specifying that if the by-laws so provide, by-law provisions adopted by
the shareholders may not be amended or repealed by the board. Consequently, shareholders may reserve to themselves exclusive by-law power
at any time, even when not so provided in the articles of incorporation.
Corporations concerned with defense against hostile takeover bids
obviously will be concerned about the substantive change made by New
BCA section 2.25, since it gives a bidder a powerful tool in a fight for
corporate control. New BCA section 2.25, coupled with the changes
made elsewhere in the New BCA allowing shareholders to act by majority written consent in the absence of a contrary provision in the articles
of incorporation, is particularly severe for public corporations in existence prior to July 1, 1984. Such pre-existing corporations likely will not
have a provision in their articles of incorporation restricting action by
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shareholders by majority written consent because the Old BCA required
unanimous written consent. Suddenly, by virtue of the New BCA becoming effective, by-laws of these corporations can be amended and the
by-law power of their boards of directors can be eliminated, both by written consent of a majority shareholder. New BCA section 2.25 is an example of an important policy change (and, incidentally, a reduction
rather than an increase in corporate flexibility), imposed on existing as
well as new corporations, that deserved but did not receive broad public
exposure and comment prior to its adoption.
C.

CORPORATE POWERS

The Old BCA section 5 provisions are modified somewhat in New
BCA section 3.10 to broaden and improve the statement of general corporate powers. For example, the power of a corporation under Old BCA
section 5(d) to own and deal in property as "appropriate to enable it to
accomplish any or all of its purposes" is broadened in New BCA section
3.10(d) by omission of the quoted limitation; the power to make loans to
employees is expanded in New BCA section 3.10(f) by eliminating the
Old BCA section 5(f) limitation that permitted such loans only to enable
employees to acquire, own and improve homes; and the power of a corporation under Old BCA section 5(p) to indemnify its directors, officers,
employees and agents by "appropriate provisions in the by-laws" is improved in New BCA section 3.10(p) by eliminating the "by-laws"
limitation.
Although the statement of powers is improved, New BCA section
3.10 falls short of overall modernization. For example, the New BCA
has no counterpart to the 1983 amendment to Delaware General Corporation Law section 122(13) which expressly empowers Delaware corporations to guarantee obligations of their parent corporations and of
sibling corporations-an amendment which aids businesses conducted
through a holding company-subsidiary form of organization. Another
example of insufficient modernization is found in New BCA section
3.10(m). That section broadens the power "to lend money to the State or
Federal government" and to transact "business in aid of the United
States" by eliminating the limitation in Old BCA section 5(m) that allowed such power to be exercised only to support a war effort. However,
New BCA section 3.10(m) still does not empower transaction of business
in aid of any government other than the federal government. In contrast,
Delaware General Corporation Law section 122(12) empowers any lawful business in aid of any "governmental authority," as does ABA Expo-
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sure Draft section 3.02(15) which simply provides for "any lawful
business that will aid governmental policy."
D.

CORPORATE AND ASSUMED NAMES

New BCA Article 4, which combines into one location the name
provisions in the Old BCA for both domestic and foreign corporations,
makes three substantive changes: (1) the standard for determining the
availability of a corporate or assumed name is changed; (2) the assumed
name provisions in the Old BCA are expanded to allow the use of more
than one such name; and (3) provision is made for the reservation of a
name, with an unlimited number of annual renewal rights, by a foreign
corporation which has no existing plans to qualify in Illinois. Of the
three changes, the first is a basic public policy change which eliminates
some protection that had been provided by the Old BCA, the second
change is one of questionable merit, and the third change is of minor
importance and is not discussed below.
1. Availability Of Names
Under New BCA section 4.05(a)(3), a corporate or assumed name is
available for use by a domestic or foreign corporation if it is "distinguishable upon the records" of the Illinois Secretary of State from other names
on file. In contrast is the requirement in Old BCA sections 9(c), 9a,
104(a) and 104a that made a name unavailable if it was "the same as, or
deceptively similar to," another name on file.
"Distinguishable upon the records" is the standard in both Delaware General Corporation Law section 102(a)(1) and the ABA Exposure
Draft section 4.01(b). As explained in the official commentary on the
ABA Exposure Draft section 4.01, the standard is intended to require
only such difference in names as will allow the Secretary of State to distinguish among corporations for administrative purposes. This stands in
contrast to the "deceptively similar" standard in the Old BCA, which
was intended to serve the additional purpose of protecting against unfair
competition and deception of the public. 23 Under the New BCA, issues
as to unfair competition and deception are left to the statutory and common law dealing with such matters, such as the Uniform Deceptive
24
Trade Practices Act.
The "distinguishable upon the records" standard clearly is the modem trend and should reduce the administrative burden on the Secretary
23. 1 ILL. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. at 94-95 (3rd ed. 1975).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-

,

311-317 (1983).
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of State's office. The offsetting disadvantage is that under the New BCA,
corporations and counsel no longer will have the benefit which they had
under the "deceptively similar" standard of the Secretary of State's prescreening of names, and thus will have a greater burden of determining
whether the use of a selected name may result in unfair competition or
deception of the public. Because the screening for deceptive similarity
needs to be done in all events, the choice as to the appropriate public
policy concerning availability of names might better have been based
upon a determination as to what method is most cost effective-central
screening by the Secretary of State or individual screening by each corporation with whatever resources it has available.
2. Assumed Names
Of dubious merit is the revision in the New BCA of the assumed
name provisions, which were first introduced into the Old BCA in 1980,
to greatly expand the permitted corporate use of assumed names.
The most common corporate use of assumed names involves division and trade names. The use of such names has been legally permissible when coupled with disclosure of the true corporate name. Under
New BCA section 4.15(b) (as was also true under Old BCA section 9(e)),
that practice is expressly permitted to continue without compliance with
the statutory assumed name provisions.
With the use of division and trade names accommodated, the need
for corporate authority to use other assumed names relates to the limited
situation in which a foreign corporation cannot gain admission to a state
under its true name due to a conflict with a name already on file. ABA
Exposure Draft section 15.06 confines its assumed name provisions to
that limited situation. The New BCA (as did the Old BCA) permits admission of a foreign corporation under an assumed name in such circumstances, but goes further by allowing foreign corporations admitted, or
seeking admission, to do business in Illinois to adopt assumed names
even when their true names are available for use, and by also allowing
Illinois corporations to adopt assumed names, in each case without requiring the use of the assumed names to be coupled with a disclosure of
the true corporate name.
The difference between the New BCA and the Old BCA is essentially one of degree. New BCA section 4.15 permits a corporation to
register more than one assumed name while Old BCA sections 9a and
104a permitted only one per corporation. Further, while an assumed
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name had to have a corporate suffix under the Old BCA, such a suffix is
not required under New BCA section 4.15(a).
The Advisory Committee's Official Comments offer no explanation
of the reason for expanding the assumed name provisions in the New
BCA. However, the Draft Comments submitted by the Illinois Secretary
of State to the General Assembly (the "Draft Comments") indicate that
the principal purpose is "to provide a central registration at the state
level of divisional names or other assumed names of corporations" and
that "[t]he public will benefit from such a registry" because "[b]usinesses
and consumers will be able to quickly determine the true name of the
party with whom they are dealing by calling or writing the Secretary of
State." If such a practice develops, the fees charged for assumed name
registration ($20 filing fee plus $150 for five years) will fall far short of
covering the administrative costs. Furthermore, the reasoning is circuitous in that there would be no public need to inquire of a central registry
if the New BCA did not authorize the general use by corporations of
assumed names without disclosure of their true corporate names. Finally, such a purpose for the central registry would be valid only if the
registry were made comprehensive so that it covered assumed names of
all entities rather than just assumed names of corporations.
What purpose, then, is served by the expanded assumed name provisions? Except for foreign corporations needing to qualify under assumed
names due to name conflict problems, there appears to be little, if any,
need for the assumed name provisions. An assumed name filing cannot
be used solely as a name-holding device because that is prevented by the
New BCA section 4.15(c)(3) requirement of a declared intention to transact business under the assumed name. Although the New BCA makes a
corporate suffix to an assumed name unnecessary, utilization of that provision likely will be deterred by the risk of losing corporate limited liability. To avoid that risk, an assumed name with no corporate suffix should
be used only in conjunction with disclosure of the true corporate name,
but in that case, by the terms of the New BCA, no assumed name filing is
required.
Use of an assumed name with a corporate suffix for an active corporation will be constrained by the fact that corporations conducting business on a multi-state basis typically make a large investment in
developing good will under a given name. Without comparable assumed
name provisions throughout the United States-and the ABA Exposure
Draft indicates that the trend may be in the opposite direction-a corporation engaged in a multi-state business is unlikely to invest in promoting
an assumed name.
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An assumed name with a corporate suffix might be useful for a local
business, but such a business could accomplish the same end result, with
less public confusion, by changing its true corporate name. An assumed
name with a corporate suffix might be useful for a multi-state, as well as a
local, business during a temporary transition period, such as following an
acquisition. However, the use of a division name coupled with disclosure
of the true corporate name, which requires no filing, or the use of a
name-holding subsidiary are adequate alternatives.
E.

SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NONADMITTED FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS

In addition to various changes intended to make technical improvements in the Old BCA's registered office and register agent provisions,
New BCA Article 5 adds an important new provision relating to service
of process on foreign corporations. Specifically, New BCA section 5.30
appoints the Illinois Secretary of State as agent for service of process of
any foreign corporation that transacts business in Illinois without having
obtained a certificate of authority to do so. The Advisory Committee's
Official Comments to New BCA section 5.30 explain the purpose of the
section as follows:
It fills a gap in the present statutory scheme. The Advisory Committee
believed that failure to comply with the provisions . . . on qualification to do business should not benefit a foreign corporation by making
service upon it in Illinois difficult or impossible.
Section 5.30 presumably was written with the knowledge that the
Illinois "long-arm" statute2 5 already permits personal service on any defendant outside Illinois as to any cause of action arising from the "transaction of any business within" Illinois. Thus the statutory "gap" referred
to in the Official Comments must be one or both of two possibilities.
First,literally applied, New BCA section 5.30 expands the jurisdiction of
courts in Illinois by providing for service of process on a foreign corporation as to a cause of action unrelated to the business done in Illinois,
while under the "long-arm" statute that relationship must exist. Second,
service of process may be more immediately achieved under New BCA
section 5.30 by serving the Illinois Secretary of State, rather than by serving the defendant outside the state under the "long-arm" statute.
However, were either of these "gaps" really a problem that needed
to be corrected? If so, should the changes have been made instead in the
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,

2-209 (1983).
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"long-arm" statute or at least cross-referenced in that statute since New
BCA section 5.30 in effect expands the substance of that statute?
F.

SHARES

New BCA Article 6 makes a number of changes pertaining to shares
of Illinois corporations. The overall result is increased flexibility,
although one of the changes-the elimination of the par value conceptdecreases flexibility or at least makes flexibility more cumbersome to
achieve. The elimination of the par value concept, being part of a larger
change imposed without choice on pre-existing Illinois corporations that
may have substantive importance for at least some of those corporations,
is further discussed below, under "Distributions."
Another change-the elimination in the New BCA of the Old
BCA's express prohibition against the use of future services as consideration for the issuance of shares-is less than it might seem at first blush,
since the New BCA is actually intended to continue that prohibition.
Under New BCA section 6.30, as was true under Old BCA section 18,
the types of consideration for which shares may be issued are to be determined by the board of directors. However, the express prohibitions in
Old BCA section 18 against paying for issued shares with promissory
notes or promises of future services are dropped in New BCA section
6.30. While the deletion is intended to end the prohibition against using
promissory notes to pay for issued shares that existed under the Old
BCA, according to the Official Comments to New BCA section 6.30 the
deletion is intended to continue the prohibition against accepting a promise of future services as a payment for shares. The continued ban against
promises of future services is intended to derive from the retained statutory language that states that the "consideration for the issuance of
shares may be paid . . .in labor or services actually performed for the

corporation."' 26 For the uninitiated to read that language as a prohibition with respect to promises of future services, they must read "may be
paid" as meaning "must only be paid." To avoid a trap for the unwary,
the better method of retaining the prohibition with respect to promises of
future services would have been to express it in the statute as was done in
the Old BCA.
G.

SHAREHOLDERS

New BCA Article 7 contains provisions relating to shareholders'
26. New BCA, § 6.30 (emphasis added).
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meetings, voting, rights to inspect corporate records and derivative actions. These provisions make numerous changes from the Old BCA
which, overall, constitute an improvement, but repeatedly fall short of
the current "state of the art" on the subjects covered.
1. Shareholders' Meetings
Old BCA section 26 required annual meetings of shareholders to be
held "at such time as may be provided in the by-laws." New BCA section 7.05 adds, as an alternative, that the by-laws may permit the board
of directors, by resolution, to fix the time for holding the annual meeting
each year. This approaches, but does not fully achieve, the flexibility of
Delaware General Corporation Law section 211 (b) which requires an annual meeting to be held "on a date and at a time designated by or in the
manner provided in the by-laws." '27 The Delaware provisions allow
someone other than the board to fix the date and time of the meeting.
Similarly, ABA Exposure Draft section 7.01(a) simply requires an annual
meeting to be held "at a time stated in or fixed in accordance with the
28
bylaws."
The Old BCA provided no remedy for failure to hold an annual
meeting of shareholders. New BCA section 7.05 repairs this omission by
allowing a shareholder who would be entitled to vote at the annual meeting to apply for a court order directing the holding of such meeting if it is
not held within a prescribed time. Unfortunately, the draftsmanship
leaves a great deal to be desired.
First, the provision borrows the time period formula (but not the
text) used in ABA Exposure Draft section 7.03(a)(1) by allowing application to be made for a court-ordered meeting if the annual meeting is not
held by the earlier of (i) six months after the end of the corporation's
fiscal year or (ii) 15 months after the last annual meeting. Unlike the
ABA Exposure Draft, New BCA section 7.05 also conditions the right to
apply for the court order upon the corporation's failure to give notice of
the annual meeting within 60 days after the shareholder's written request
for such a notice to be given is directed to the corporation's president. It
is unclear whether such a written request may be made before the period
resulting from the "six months/15 months" formula has expired or may
be made only after that period has expired, and the Official Comments
provide no guidance.
Second, the provision is ineptly worded in that it provides that a
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1983)(emphasis added).
28. ABA Exposure Draft, supra note 8, § 7.01(a)(emphasis added).
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shareholder may apply for a court order directing that a meeting be held,
but fails to state that a court has authority to grant the order. Section
7.05 goes on to state that "[t]he court may issue such additionalorders as
may be necessary or appropriate for the holding of the meeting." 29 Thus,
the court's authority to order an annual meeting is implied, rather than
expressly granted. In contrast, ABA Exposure Draft section 7.03(a) expressly grants authority for a court to "order a meeting to be held," as
does Delaware General Corporation Law section 211 (c).
Third, New BCA section 7.05 says that "[t]he court may issue such
additional orders as may be necessary or appropriate for the holding of
the meeting"-a vague formula to be defined in future litigation. In contrast, both ABA Exposure Draft section 7.03(b) and Delaware General
Corporation law section 211 (c) supplement similar wording with a specification of the court's authority to fix the time, place, record date and
form of notice for the meeting, and an authorization of special quorum
requirements for court-ordered meetings. 30 With no counterpart in New
BCA section 7.05 for special quorum requirements, it seems unlikely that
a court could issue an order overriding the general quorum requirements
contained in New BCA section 7.60. Thus, a court-ordered meeting
could not transact business if such general quorum requirements are not
met.
2.

Informal Action By Shareholders

Old BCA section 147 permitted shareholders, in lieu of voting at a
meeting, to take action by unanimous written consent. New BCA section 7.10 adds an alternative, modeled on Delaware General Corporation
Law section 228, which permits, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the articles of incorporation, action by written consent by shareholders having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be
necessary to take the action at a meeting at which the holders of all
shares entitled to vote are present. However, New BCA section 7.10 has
a requirement, not found in its Delaware counterpart, that five days prior
written notice of the proposed action must be given to all shareholders.
Unfortunately, the notice requirement is inartfully drafted, leaving it un29. New BCA, § 7.05 (emphasis added).
30. ABA Exposure Draft, supra note 8, § 7.03(b), describes the court's authority as follows:
The court may fix the time and place of the meeting, specify a record date for determining
shareholders entitled to notice of and to vote at the meeting, prescribe the form and content of the meeting notice, fix the quorum required for the meeting (or direct that the votes
represented at the meeting constitute a quorum for the meeting), and enter other orders
necessary to accomplish the purpose or purposes of the meeting.
Delaware's provision is just as explicit. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (1983).
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clear whether the notice must precede the signing of the consent by five
days or merely precede the effectiveness of the action taken by five days.
The sentence structure favors the former interpretation which, in any
event, is the interpretation that should be followed to avoid the risk of
invalid action.
Obviously, the requirement for advance notice gives those opposed
an opportunity to challenge the action before it is taken. But the advance
notice requirement is in addition to the New BCA section 7.10(b) requirement, copied from Delaware General Corporation Law section
228(c), that notice of the action taken by written consent be promptly
given to those who did not consent. While the consent procedure is intended to be an efficient method of taking shareholder action, 3' the Illinois requirement of two notices-before and after action is taken-runs
counter to any notion of efficiency.
3.

Waiver Of Notice

New BCA section 7.20 copies the general waiver of notice provision
from Old BCA section 145 and adds a provision, not found in the Old
BCA, that attendance at a meeting constitutes a waiver of notice unless
the person attending "objects to the holding of the meeting because
proper notice was not given."
As drafted, New BCA section 7.20 has two peculiarities. The first
derives from the fact that Old BCA section 145 authorized written waivers of notice by directors as well as shareholders. Because Old BCA
section 145 is copied verbatim into New BCA section 7.20, the wording
("person or persons entitled to such notice") continues to be broad
enough to cover written waivers of notice by directors as well as by
shareholders. However, placing this language in Article 7, which by its
title relates only to shareholders, suggests that section 7.20 should be
construed to apply only to written waivers of notice by shareholders.
Given the source of the text, the better (and literal) interpretation would
apply New BCA section 7.20 to written waivers by directors as well as
shareholders, despite its placement. 32 Those using the New BCA simply
31. See Official Comments, supra note 9, § 7.10.
32. Other language in New BCA § 7.20, which deems attendance at a meeting to be a waiver of
notice in the absence of an objection that proper notice was not given, also is broad enough to apply
to directors as well as shareholders, even though placed in Article 7 which by its title relates only to
shareholders. However, New BCA § 8.25 covers the same subject (waiver of notice by attendance)
for directors only. Arguably, this indicates an intent to have all of New BCA § 7.20 apply only to
shareholders, but that would leave the New BCA without a provision for written waivers of notice
by directors.
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will have to remember that written waivers of notice by directors are
provided for in the shareholders' provisions in Article 7.
The second peculiarity of New BCA section 7.20 relates to the provision that attendance of a meeting constitutes waiver of notice unless the
person at the meeting objects to the holding of the meeting on the
grounds that proper notice was not given. The language used does not
specify when such an objection must be raised at the meeting, leaving
that question to be decided in future litigation. The better approach,
avoiding the need for judicial interpretation, is to require the objection to
be raised at the beginning of the meeting, as Delaware General Corporation Law section 229 and ABA Exposure Draft section 7.06(b) do.
4.

Record Dates

New BCA section 7.25 makes three changes in Old BCA section 29
by (1) eliminating as outmoded provisions for closing the share transfer
books as an alternative to fixing record dates; (2) making changes concerning record dates to correlate with changes in the minimum notice
required under New BCA section 7.15 for certain shareholders' meetings 33; and (3) allowing the by-laws to "establish a mechanism for determining record dates" in lieu of having them established by the board of
directors. These are appropriate improvements, but one needed improvement was not made. Old BCA section 29 statutorily fixed the record
date, when none was otherwise fixed, only for payments of dividends and
meetings of shareholders, leaving uncovered any other instance for which
a record date is needed, such as the record date for action by written
consent. That deficiency is not corrected in New BCA section 7.25. Delaware General Corporation Law section 213(b), in contrast, comprehen34
sively fixes record dates which are not fixed by the board of directors.
5.

Voting Lists

New BCA section 7.30 makes a seemingly purposeless technical
change as well as an important policy change concerning the list of
shareholders entitled to vote that must be made available by a corporation in connection with a meeting of its shareholders.
33. New BCA § 7.15 requires 20 days minimum notice of meetings at which a merger, consolidation, share exchange, dissolution, or sale, lease or exchange of assets is to be acted upon, whereas
Old BCA § 27 required 20 days minimum notice only for a merger or consolidation. The record
date provisions in New BCA § 7.25 require a record date at least 20 days prior to the meeting in
each instance in which 20 days minimum notice is required under New BCA § 7.15.
34. The ABA Exposure Draft, supra note 8, also has a comprehensive record date scheme,
although the applicable provisions are scattered in that Act, such as in sections 6.40(b), 7.02(b),
7.04(b), 7.05(d) and 7.07.
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Under Old BCA section 32, the list had to be prepared and made
available for inspection by shareholders at least 10 days prior to the
meeting. Under New BCA section 7.30, the list must be preparedby the
earlierof (i) 20 days after the record date for the meeting or (ii) 10 days
prior to the meeting. The change in this requirement seems to have no
purpose because the list still need not be made vailable for inspection
35
under New BCA section 7.30 until 10 days prior to the meeting.
The important policy change made in New BCA section 7.30 is that
shareholders are expressly permitted to copy the list of shareholders
without any showing of proper purpose as would be required if a copy
were requested under New BCA section 7.75(b), pertaining to shareholders' rights to inspect corporate records. Publicly-held corporations likely
will find objectionable the right to copy the list of shareholders without a
showing of proper purpose. The Advisory Committee's Official Comments offer no justification for this exception to the New BCA section
7.75(b) safeguards.
6.

Voting Of Shares

New BCA section 7.40 basically carries forward the Old BCA section 28 requirement that, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, each outstanding share of a corporation is entitled to one
vote on each matter submitted to shareholders and has cumulative voting
rights in elections of directors. The 1981 amendments to Old BCA section 28 allowed a corporation incorporated prior to January 1, 1982 to
amend its articles of incorporation to eliminate voting rights for any class
or series of shares, or to eliminate cumulative voting in the election of
directors, but only if the amendment was unanimously approved by the
shareholders. New BCA section 7.40(c) dispenses with the unanimous
approval requirement. Consequently, such amendments for pre-1982
corporations require only the vote needed for other charter amendments.
However, any limitation or elimination of cumulative voting rights by
such corporations apparently gives rise to dissenters' rights under New
35. Peculiarly, the penalty for failure to prepare the list, or to make it available, as required by
law, was copied from Old BCA § 32 into New BCA § 7.30, without adjustment for the difference
between the New BCA and the Old BCA, even though under the Old BCA the deadlines for preparing the list and making it available fell on the same day, which is not always true under the New
BCA. Thus, failure to prepare the list within 20 days after the record date as required by the New
BCA (if the twentieth day is more than 10 days prior to the meeting) makes the responsible officer
liable for damages suffered by the complaining shareholder. Given that the list need not be made
available for inspection until 10 days prior to the meeting, what damages would a shareholder suffer
from the officer's failure to prepare the list by an earlier date?
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BCA section 11.65(a)(3)(iii). 36
The provisions of New BCA section 7.40(c) may in fact be overridden in part by the decision in Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar.37 The
Illinois Constitution of 1870 in effect required cumulative voting rights
for all shares of an Illinois corporation. A similar requirement was not
included in the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which became effective on
July 1, 1971, but Section 8 of the Transition Schedule therein provides
that "[s]hareholders of all corporations heretofore organized under any
law of this State which requires cumulative voting. . . shall retain their
right to vote cumulatively." Despite the constitutional change which
became effective in 1971, cumulative voting rights for all shares continued to be statutorily required until the change made by the 1981 amendments to the Old BCA discussed above. Roanoke Agency, Inc. had been
incorporated in 1963 while the Illinois Constitution of 1870 was in effect.
Proceeding under the 1981 amendments to the Old BCA, the corporation, with the unanimous approval of its shareholders, sought to amend
its articles of incorporation to provide for the issuance of a class of nonvoting shares. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld its right to do so,
holding, on constitutional grounds, that a corporation in existence prior
to July 1, 1971 may authorize nonvoting shares (i.e., eliminate cumulative voting), provided that the unanimous approval of its existing shareholders is obtained. Although the Illinois Supreme Court expressly
refused to say that its decision would be the same under the provisions in
New BCA section 7.40(c), 38 until a different interpretation is indicated to
be appropriate by the Illinois courts, it seems prudent to view section
7.40(c) as if the Roanoke decision applies. That view would mean that a
pre-July 1, 1971 corporation may eliminate cumulative voting rights only
by the unanimous approval of its shareholders, and until that is done, it
cannot eliminate or limit voting rights in the election of directors for any
class or series of shares without the same unanimous vote.
7.

Voting Of Shares By Certain Persons

New BCA section 7.45 combines into one section certain provisions
from Old BCA sections 28 and 30. These provisions permit a corporation to vote those of its own shares which it holds in a fiduciary capacity
36. New BCA § 11.65(a) does not expressly provide for dissenters' rights if a pre-1982 corporation simply eliminates the voting rights of a particular class or series of shares. However, any such
amendment that prevents a class or series from voting in an election of directors in effect eliminates
cumulative voting rights as well, so that dissenters' rights should apply to such an amendment.
37. 101 Ill. 2d 315, 461 N.E.2d 1365 (1984).
38. Id. at 328, 461 N.E.2d at 1371-72.
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and also specify who may vote pledged shares, shares controlled by a
receiver and shares registered in the name of another corporation, a deceased person, a minor ward or a person under legal disability.
As written, New BCA section 7.45 is disappointing. Desirable improvements were not attempted. Instead, what the Official Comments
call "stylistic changes" were made in the Old BCA provisions. Notwithstanding that disclaimer, in one instance-pertaining to voting of shares
held by another corporation-substantive changes were in fact made, but
unfortunately their effect is only to add needless complications.
Under Old BCA section 30, a corporate shareholder had to show
who had the authority to vote the shares which it owned, by means of an
appropriate provision in the corporate shareholder's by-laws or a resolution of the corporate shareholder's board. New BCA section 7.45, with
far more complicated language, comes to the same result.
New BCA section 7.45 then adds a feature not found in Old BCA
section 30, namely, that the person or office entitled to vote the shares of
a corporate shareholder must be "registered" on the share transfer books
and "included in" the list of shareholders that must be made available
under New BCA section 7.30 for any meeting of shareholders. Particularly for large, publicly-held corporations, this requirement likely will be
a burden, without any apparent benefit. Remember that under New
BCA section 7.30, the list of shareholders must be prepared within 20
days after the record date. The demonstration of authority to vote shares
held by a corporate shareholder of a publicly-owned corporation ordinarily will accompany its proxy sent after the list of shareholders is required to be prepared under New BCA section 7.30. Must that list be
revised when such evidence of authority is received? If not, what value
(purpose) can there be in having outdated (last year's) information in the
list?
New BCA section 7.45 also fails to make an improvement that experience shows is needed, namely, a provision as to how to treat a vote cast
by only one of two or more persons who share the power to vote, such as
shares held by joint tenants or co-trustees. Both Delaware General Corporation Law section 217(b) and ABA Exposure Draft section 7.24(b)(5)
provide for that situation, but New BCA section 7.45 does not.
8.

Proxies

Old BCA section 28 permitted voting by proxy, but provided that
no proxy would be valid after 11 months from the date of its execution
unless otherwise specified in the proxy. New BCA section 7.50 continues
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the substance of Old BCA section 28 and adds provisions governing revocation of proxies as well as extensive provisions for irrevocable proxies.
New BCA section 7.50(b), for which there was no counterpart in the
Old BCA, prescribes how a proxy may be revoked. One provision that
may prove controversial states that the dates on contradictory proxies
"presumptively determine the order of execution, regardless of the postmark dates on the envelopes in which they are mailed." Resort to postmarks is a typical method of choosing between contradictory proxies of
the same date from the same shareholder. Does the presumption established by section 7.50(b) bar that practice? The presumption may also
generate other problems. For example, it seems to encourage, in a contested situation, the solicitation of postdated proxies or undated proxies
to be dated at the last minute by the proxy holder. Also, the text of New
BCA section 7.50(b) seems to say that a proxy is presumed valid even if
dated after the date of the postmark on the envelope in which it is
mailed, although the presumption as thus applied obviously is
unjustified.
New BCA section 7.50(c)-(g) contain extensive provisions governing
irrevocable proxies and other proxy questions. These provisions are
taken from New York Business Corporation Law section 609 and ABA
Exposure Draft section 7.22. Unfortunately, the New BCA paraphrases
its sources inartfully. For example, in New BCA section 7.50(e) the situation in which "the creditor's debt is paid" is listed as an instance in
which an irrevocable proxy becomes revocable, when in fact it is not the
debt of the creditor that is involved. The correct description of the situation should be "when the debt owed the creditor is paid."
9.

Proxy Solicitation

New BCA section 7.55, for which there was no counterpart in the
Old BCA, prohibits the solicitation of a proxy:
by means of any communication containing a statement which, at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to
state any material fact necessary in order that the statements made not
be false and misleading.
This disclosure standard is taken from Rule 14a-9, 39 promulgated by the
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1984). New BCA § 7.55 borrows only part of the disclosure
formula in SEC Rule 14a-9. Omitted is the part which forbids the omission from a communication
of any material fact "necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect
to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or
misleading."
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Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Advisory Committee clearly did not view section 7.55 as a significant change, stating in the Official Comments that it "is probably declarative of existing case law." Notwithstanding that comment, New
BCA section 7.55 establishes, rather than codifies, the Illinois disclosure
standards for proxy solicitations. The incorrect assumption that existing
case law was being codified may also explain why section 7.55 was so
written as to leave open some important questions as to its application.
It long has been uncertain whether the federal disclosure standard is
the same as or stricter than the state common law disclosure requirement
and, if there is a difference, whether the difference has any practical significance. 40 To resolve those issues, there have been suggestions that the
states should apply the federal standard. 4 1 This has been done in some
instances. The federal standard was applied, for example, in Brown v.
Ward,42 in which the Alaska Supreme Court simply assumed that there
was no substantive difference between the state common law rule and
SEC Rule 14a-9. However, the dissenting opinion in that case, after a
review of the authorities, concluded that the common law requirement
was "a compromise position between 3the federal standard and the com4
mon law tort of misrepresentation.
New BCA section 7.55 moots the question as to what the Illinois
common law standard is by statutorily adopting the federal standard.
Presumably, this adoption brings with it the extensive, complex and still
evolving interpretations of SEC Rule 14a-9.
In the federal scheme of regulation, SEC Rule 14a-9 is coupled with
SEC Rule 14a-344 which requires a proxy statement containing specified
information to be used for proxy solicitations. In the New BCA, the
disclosure standard in section 7.55 is not coupled with a requirement similar to SEC Rule 14a-3. Nevertheless, both SEC Rule 14a-9 and New
BCA section 7.55 key on some disclosure being made that is false or
misleading. Inasmuch as the New BCA does not require any disclosure,
may New BCA section 7.55 be avoided by making no disclosure? Will a
simple request for a proxy, without any express disclosure relating to the
matters to be voted upon, be construed as an implied disclosure recom40. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 917 (2d ed. 1961).

41. See Comment, Standards of Disclosure in Proxy Solicitation of Unlisted Securities, 1960
DUKE L.J. 623, 636; Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1264
(1960).
42. 593 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1979).
43. Id. at 255.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1984).
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mending that a proxy be given, so that an omission of disclosures weighing against the giving of the proxy will violate New BCA section 7.55?
The same question would exist even if New BCA section 7.55 had not
been adopted, but when the state legislates the disclosure standard, one
objective, not achieved in this instance, should be to provide more certainty as to the application of the rule than would be possible if the rule
were left to be developed by court decisions.
A second question left unanswered by New BCA section 7.55 and
the Official Comments is whether the requirements of section 7.55 also
apply to the solicitation of a written shareholder's consent. SEC Rule
14a-l(d) 4 5 defines "proxy" to include such a consent. The New BCA

does not contain a similar definition. There is no policy reason why the
solicitation of a consent should be treated differently than a solicitation
of a proxy. Consequently, it seems likely that the courts will correct the
draftsmen's omission by allowing New BCA section 7.55 to be applied to
a solicitation of a written shareholder's consent, either by construing
"proxy" to have the same meaning as it does in SEC Rule 14a-9 or by
construing section 7.55 as a declaration of public policy to be applied as a
matter of common law to solicitations of such consents.
10. Shareholders' Quorum And Voting
New BCA section 7.60 defines what constitutes a quorum and the
vote required for shareholders' action when a different requirement is not
specified in the articles of incorporation. The section in effect changes
Old BCA section 31 to provide for instances in which a corporation has
nonvoting shares-a correction that should have been made when the
1981 amendments to the Old BCA first authorized nonvoting shares.
Unfortunately, New BCA section 7.60 inadequately accommodates
a corporation that has shares with more or less than one full vote per
share. Although section 7.60 allows the articles of incorporation to define the voting power that must be present to constitute a quorum and
the vote needed to take shareholders' action, a quorum requirement thus
fixed may not be "less than one-third of the outstanding shares entitled so
to vote" and the vote required to take action may not be less than "the
affirmative vote of the majority of the shares represented at the meeting
and entitled to vote on a matter."' 46 An adequate accommodation would
have added to section 7.60 (or possibly to section 7.40) a counterpart to
Delaware General Corporation Law section 212(a), which automatically
45.
46.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(d) (1984).
New BCA, § 7.60 (emphasis added).
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converts into "votes" statutory voting requirements expressed in terms of
"shares" when a corporation has voting shares with more or less than
one full vote per share.
Without a provision similar to the one in Delaware General Corporation Law section 212(a), shares given more or less than one full vote
per share by the articles of incorporation will nevertheless have only one
vote per share for various other purposes under the New BCA. For example, an amendment to the articles of incorporation is adopted under
New BCA section 10.20(c) "upon receiving the affirmative vote of the
holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares entitled to vote on
such amendment."' 47 For a corporation with, say, two classes of voting
shares-Class A with one vote per share and Class B with five votes per
share-voting without class distinction on an amendment, Class B shares
will be treated by New BCA section 10.20(c) as if they have only one
vote per share. Attempts to cure the problem by appropriate provisions
in the articles of incorporation will be limited by New BCA section
10.20(d) which forbids a voting requirement of "less than a majority of
the outstanding shares entitled to vote."'4 8 The New BCA's one vote per
share requirement also applies to voting on other transactions, such as
share exchanges, mergers and consolidations (New BCA section 11.20),
dissolutions (New BCA section 12.15(c)), and dispositions of all or substantially all assets not in the usual course of business (New BCA section
11.60(c)).
11.

Voting Trust and Voting Agreements

New BCA section 7.65 carries forward, with minor rephrasing, the
voting trust provisions in Old BCA section 30a. However, the New BCA
goes on to add section 7.70, for which there was no counterpart in the
Old BCA. New BCA section 7.70 validates agreements made by shareholders for the voting of their shares, with express provision that such
agreements are not subject to the voting trust provisions in New BCA
section 7.65. 49 While New BCA section 7.70 attempts to resolve some
uncertainties in the Illinois law about shareholders' agreements, it also,
in some respects, contradicts the public policy expressed for voting trusts
in New BCA section 7.65.
The decision in Galler v. Galler 50 is generally considered to have left
47. Id. at § 10.20(c) (emphasis added).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. The Draft Comments indicate that New BCA § 7.70 "is modeled after similar provisions in
other states, such as Delaware." It is also similar to ABA Exposure Draft § 7.31.
50. 32 Il1. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
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uncertainty as to the validity of shareholders' agreements under Illinois
law when less than all shareholders are parties to the agreement or when
other interests are affected, such as the rights of creditors. In 1977, Illinois adopted The Close Corporation Act 5' which authorizes shareholders' agreements for the conduct of the affairs of corporations qualifying
as close corporations under that Act. 52 That statutory provision is consistent with Galler in that the statutorily-authorized agreement must be
between all shareholders of the close corporation and the statutory grant
of validity applies only "as between the parties" to the agreement, without purporting to deal with the question of validity when third-party
rights are involved.
In contrast, New BCA section 7.70 seeks to overcome rather than
conform to Galler, insofar as shareholders' voting agreements are concerned. The objective, according to the Advisory Committee's Official
Comments, is as follows:
Section 7.70 seeks to remove any doubt of the validity and specific
enforceability of shareholder agreements by providing that such agreements "for the voting of shares" may be made without apparent statutory reservations, limitations, or 53restrictions, and without electing
statutory close corporation status.
That should assure the enforcement of voting agreements, even when
made by less than all of the shareholders. However, New BCA section
7.70 is limited to voting agreement; agreements covering other matters
remain subject to Galler.
The validation of shareholders' voting agreements in New BCA section 7.70 in some respects is contradictory of the voting trust provisions
in New BCA section 7.65. The voting trust provisions require that such
voting arrangements not be secret (i.e., the trust agreement must be in
writing and filed with the corporation, where it must be made available
for inspection by shareholders and voting trust beneficiaries), and the duration of a voting trust must be limited to 10 years. In contrast, under
New BCA section 7.70 a voting agreement dealing with the same subject-shareholder voting-may be secret and of unlimited duration.
Also, New BCA section 7.50(c)(5) permits an irrevocable proxy to be
given to a party to a section 7.70 voting agreement, thereby providing a
mechanism for accomplishing the same result as a voting trust, free of
the requirements applicable to voting trusts under New BCA section
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, J 1201-1216 (1983).
52. Id. at 1211.
53. See Official Comments, supra note 9, § 7.70.
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7.65. The Official Comments offer no explanation for this contradictory
result.

12. Rights Of Shareholders To Examine CorporateRecords
New BCA section 7.75 makes several modifications in the provisions
of Old BCA section 45 concerning shareholders' rights to examine and
copy records of a corporation. According to the Secretary of State's
Draft Comments, several of the changes are intended to make the provisions parallel those in Delaware General Corporation Law section 220.
The need for improvement or further explanation for certain of the
changes is illustrated by the following examples.
1. The right granted by Old BCA section 45 to holders of voting
trust certificates to examine and copy corporate records has been eliminated. As changed, holders of voting trust certificates have the right
under New BCA section 7.65 to examine the voting trust agreement on
file with the corporation, but not the other records of the corporation.
Neither the Official Comments nor the Draft Comments offer a reason
for this change.
2. New BCA section 7.75(b) conditions the right to examine and
copy records upon a prior written demand having been made. The Old
BCA did not specify the manner of making the demand so that an oral
demand sufficed. 5 4 The requirement of a written demand is one of the
changes made to conform to Delaware General Corporation Law section 220, but the Advisory Committee omitted the related Delaware
Law provision that in effect requires the demand to be made at least
five business days prior to the desired examination date. 55 Under New
BCA section 7.75, as written, inspection and copying must be allowed
immediately upon presentation of a proper demand even though corporations obviously will need time to have their attorneys determine
whether the statement of purpose required to be in the demand is in
fact a legally "proper" purpose. The Delaware approach is preferrable
because it fixes the time within which the corporation must make a
decision with respect to a demand. In contrast, the New BCA, by fixing no time limit, invites controversy and litigation.
3. New BCA section 7.75(c) codifies the shareholders' right to
obtain a court order compelling examination of corporate records
when a corporation refuses to honor a proper demand. Subsection (c)
also reverses the burden of proof that existed under Old BCA section
45 by assigning to the corporation the burden of proving improper purpose when the shareholder seeks "to examine minutes or the record of
shareholders or a voting trust agreement." According to the Draft
Comments, this is another change conforming to Delaware General
Corporation Law section 220, but that is not completely accurate be54. See Hohman v. Illinois-Iowa Power Co., 305 Il1. App. 17, 26 N.E.2d 420 (1940).
55. The ABA Exposure Draft, supra note 8, § 16.02(a) also requires that the demand be made at
least five business days in advance.
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cause the Delaware Law assigns the burden of proof to the corporation
only for demands to examine the stock ledger or list of shareholders.
4. Under Old BCA section 45, an officer or agent of a corporation who refused to honor a shareholder's request to examine the corporation's books and records for a proper purpose was liable to the
shareholder in the amount of a statutorily prescribed penalty. However, it was a defense to an action to recover that penalty if the shareholder had within two years "improperly used" information secured
by a prior examination of any corporation's books and records. According to the Draft Comments, the Advisory Committee thought this
defense to be "vague" and thus eliminated it. Consequently, the defense to the penalty authorized by New BCA section 7.75(d) is narrowed to the case in which the shareholder, within the previous two
years, has "sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders of. . . any
. . . corporation or has aided or abetted any person in procuring any
list of shareholders for any such purpose." This tinkering with the
penalty provisions, increasing the pressure on corporations to honor
demands by constricting the defenses to the penalty, does not properly
balance the conflicting interests involved. A shareholder needs to have
his or her inspection allowed, free of the cost of litigation to enforce a
proper demand. A corporation may need to refuse a request and place
the matter in litigation simply to obtain court supervision of the proper
use of information obtained by the examination, especially if the shareholder has improperly used information from a prior examination (and
an improper use obviously would not be limited to a sale of a list of
shareholders). A better balancing would be achieved by deleting the
penalty provisions altogether, substituting a more equitable provision,
such as ABA Exposure Draft section 16.04(c) which simply allows a
court to award the shareholder the costs (including attorneys' fees)
which he or she has incurred if it is found that the corporation has
improperly opposed a proper request.
13.

Derivative Actions By Shareholders

New BCA section 7.80 makes a number of changes in Old BCA
section 45a, borrowing from several sources in an effort to modernize the
provisions relating to derivative actions. However, without any mention
in the Official Comments to indicate that a substantive change was intended, New BCA section 7.80 makes editorial changes in the language
of Old BCA section 45a which eliminate a holder of voting trust certificates as a party eligible to bring derivative actions, with one possible exception. That exception applies only if the holder of the voting trust
certificates acquired them by operation of law from a person who held
the voting trust certificates at the time of the complained-of transaction.
The possibility of the bizarre result that the heirs can bring a derivative action even though the decedent could not have done so had he or
she lived (because only those who acquire voting trust certificates by op-
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eration of law can be eligible to sue) appears to be the consequence of
careless editing. Old BCA section 45a required the plaintiff to be either a
"holder of shares or of voting trust certificates therefor at the time of the
transaction of which he complains," but made an exception to the
"holder . . . at the time" requirement if the "shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon [plaintiff] by operation of law from a
person who was a holder at such time." New BCA section 7.80(a) eliminates the first reference to voting trust certificates but erroneously retains
the second reference. This is one of the several drafting errors that blemish the New BCA. While unlikely to be of material consequence, it does
indicate that more time and care were needed before considering the
New BCA a finished work.
H.
1.

DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

Directors

New BCA Article 8 adds considerable flexibility not found in the
Old BCA provisions pertaining to directors. Old BCA section 34 fixed
three as the minimum number of directors for a corporation except when
there were less than three shareholders, in which case the minimum
could not be less than the number of shareholders. Further, under Old
BCA section 34 all directors had to be elected annually. In contrast,
New BCA section 8.10(a) fixes the minimum number of directors at one,
regardless of the number of shareholders. New BCA section 8.10(b) allows the by-laws to prescribe a minimum and maximum number of directors (the latter not to exceed the former by more than five), leaving it to
the directors or shareholders to change the number of directors within
that range without having to amend the by-laws. Under New BCA section 8.10(c), annual election of all directors continues to be required unless the corporation has a classified board. If the number of directors is
six or more, New BCA section 8.10(e) permits them to be divided into
56
not more than three classes to serve for staggered terms.
56. Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 101 IIl. 2d 315, 461 N.E.2d 1365 (1984), may require an
exception to the classified board provisions in New BCA § 8.10(e) for corporations in existence prior
to July 1, 1971 (when the Illinois Constitution of 1970 became effective). Roanoke indicates that a
corporation incorporated when the cumulative voting requirement in the prior Constitution was in
effect can eliminate cumulative voting only by a unanimous shareholders' vote. The Roanoke case
arose under the Old BCA and the court refused to say whether its decision applies to the New BCA
which permits elimination of cumulative voting without unanimous shareholders' approval but with
dissenters' rights available to those who oppose the change. If Roanoke does apply to the New BCA
provisions, pre-July 1, 1971 corporations that have not eliminated cumulative voting by unanimous
vote should still be subject to all of the related consequences of the former constitutional requirement
for cumulative voting, including the rule in Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Il. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955)
that classified boards violate such cumulative voting requirement.
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Old BCA section 37 allowed directors to attend meetings by conference telephone or other equipment allowing all participants to hear each
other, but only if a recording was made of the meeting with the consent
of a majority of the members of the board (or committee of the board, in
the case of a committee meeting). New BCA section 8.15(d) continues to
allow such means of attendance but dispenses with the consent and recording requirements.
Under Old BCA section 36, as amended in 1979, the articles of incorporation could authorize the directors to fill vacancies on the board,
but vacancies so filled could not exceed one-third of the total board membership. New BCA section 8.30 makes the board's power to fill vacancies
more flexible by allowing the board to fill any number of vacancies if the
by-laws do not prescribe a different method of filling vacancies.5 7 The
one remaining limitation is that those appointed by the board to fill a
vacancy in a classified board of directors may serve only until the next
meeting of shareholders at which directors are elected whereas if the vacancy is filled by the shareholders, the person may serve for the balance
of the term for which he or she is elected. The New BCA vacancy provision is a considerable improvement upon its old BCA counterpart. However, it falls short of the flexibility provided by Delaware General
Corporation Law section 223 which allows the remaining directors, even
if less than a quorum, to fill vacancies. New BCA section 8.30 has no
exception to the New BCA section 8.15 quorum requirements in the case
in which a board exercises its vacancy filling power.
2.

Removal of Directors

New BCA section 8.35 reflects a basic public policy change, granting statutory authority for the removal of directors, with or without
cause, by shareholder action. There was no counterpart to this in the
Old BCA so that, prior to the New BCA, only the common law right to
58
remove a director for cause existed.
Removal of directors without cause allows instant change of corpo57. A consequence of the Roanoke decision, if applicable to the New BCA, may be that a board
cannot fill vacancies for a pre-July 1, 1971 corporation until the corporation has eliminated cumulative voting by a unanimous vote of its shareholders. See I ILL. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 260 (3rd ed.
1975). See also People ex rel. Weber v. Cohn, 339 II1. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930), ruling that the
power of directors to fill vacancies was inconsistent with the state's Constitution in effect at that time
which required cumulative voting in the election of directors and forbade election of directors other
than by the shareholders.
58. The general common law rule is that removal for cause is an inherent power of a corporation. 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 351 (rev. perm.
ed. 1982). One Illinois case has language suggesting that, under the Illinois common law, a director
could never be removed during his or her term of office. Laughlin v. Geer, 121 I11.App. 534 (1905).
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rate management when a party or group achieves voting control. 59 As
such, the provision works against corporate management concerned with
defenses against hostile takeovers. It is not that a statutory "instant
change in control" provision of this kind is uncommon. To the contrary,
Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(k) authorizes shareholders' removal of directors without cause, as does ABA Exposure Draft section 8.08. The Illinois provision, however, does not permit any
avoidance of removal without cause. In contrast, under the Delaware
Law, removal without cause may be avoided by corporations having a
classified board of directors and under ABA Exposure Draft section 8.08
removal without cause may be barred by a charter provision. No such
choice is allowed under New BCA section 8.35. The Advisory Committee's Official Comments on that section specify that "[a] charter or bylaw provision denying the right of shareholders to remove a director,
• . . without cause, is intended to be invalid and against public policy."
To eliminate choice as a matter of public policy counts as a negative in
the list of considerations that enter into the process of selecting a domiciliary law for a corporation.
3.

Committees

New BCA section 8.40 makes a long-needed improvement by allowing a board of directors to have any number of committees. Old BCA
section 38 authorized only a single committee-an executive committee-of the board.
However, the limitations on a committee's authority are more restrictive than under either Old BCA section 38 or Delaware General
Corporation Law section 141(c). Those limitations, found in New BCA
section 8.40(c), appear to be patterned on ABA Exposure Draft section
8.25(e), with some substantive variations related to the Old BCA section
38 provisions.
The result is that the New BCA bars any committee from authorizing the issuance of shares, fixing the terms of any series of a class of
59. If cumulative voting for directors applies and if less than the whole board is to be removed,
an individual director may not be removed when the votes against removal are sufficient to elect that
person if cumulatively voted in an election of the entire board. New BCA § 8.35(a)(2). Section
8.35(a)(2) uses the same formula as Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(k)(ii) which makes
the "cumulative voting" exception apply only if less than the whole board is removed. Literally
applied, the exception would be avoided by removing the entire board even though the minority
might have sufficient votes to elect some of the directors in a general election in which cumulative
voting applies. If the shareholders voting for removal have sufficient votes, they could amend the bylaws under New BCA § 2.25 to reduce the authorized number of directors to one in conjunction
with the removal and then elect only one director to replace the former directors, thereby circumventing New BCA § 8.35(a)(2).
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shares issuable in series, or authorizing the repurchase of shares,
although those limitations did not exist under Old BCA section 38. Further, Old BCA section 38 allowed the executive committee to fix the
terms for the issuance or sale of shares, but a committee's authority to do
so under New BCA section 8.40(c) is limited to those terms specified by
the whole board. It might have been expected that committees would be
allowed to declare dividends, as permitted under Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(c), but that is barred by New BCA section
8.40(c). The Official Comments (which paraphrase the comments in the
ABA Exposure Draft in that regard) explain that the dividend power was
withheld from committees "based on the principle that prohibitions
against delegation should be limited to prohibit only such actions as...
might prove to be irrevocable (such as the declaration of a dividend)."
That principle, of course, was not consistently applied in formulating the
limitations on delegable authority although, if consistently applied, the
limitations would have been even more restrictive.
Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(c) is more flexible,
permitting delegation to committees of the dividend and stock issuance
power. Delaware provides for the regulation of the delegation by leaving
it to the board of directors to decide what limitations to impose on the
exercise of the delegated power.
4. Director Conflicts of Interest
Old BCA section 40a, added as part of the 1981 amendments to the
Old BCA, introduced a statutory rule pertaining to corporate transactions in which a director has a personal interest. New BCA section 8.60
discards the approach so recently taken in Old BCA section 40a and sets
a new public policy with respect to such transactions which should have
been, but was not, singled out for general public exposure and comment
before enactment. This flip-flop in policy also indicates an instability that
should be of concern to those selecting a domiciliary law. Further, the
change may weaken the indemnification provisions in New BCA section
8.75 which should be a matter of concern to all Illinois corporations.
Under the common law business judgment rule, a court will not review, or substitute its own judgment for, action taken by a board of directors "in good faith, in the exercise of their best judgment, and for what
they believed to be the advantage of the corporation and all its stockholders." 6 An exception exists for transactions in which a director has a personal interest. When such a personal interest is involved, the board60. Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927).
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approved transaction may be voided if the transaction is not fair to the
corporation.
It has become common for the various jurisdictions to statutorily
modify or amplify the common law rule relating to interested director
transactions. Illinois' first effort in that regard was Old BCA section 40a.
Literally applied, Old BCA section 40a avoided the "fairness" issue by
providing that a transaction would not be "void or voidable" because of a
director's interest therein if approved (after appropriate disclosure) by a
majority of disinterested directors or shareholders.
New BCA section 8.60 takes a different approach. It adopts the
majority common law rule that an interested director transaction will not
be voided if found to be fair. It then goes on to regulate the burden of
proving fairness, assigning that burden to the party claiming validity unless the transaction has been approved (after appropriate disclosure) by a
majority of the disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders, in
which case the burden of proof shifts to the party challenging the validity
of the transaction. In either event, however (and unlike Old BCA section
40a), the issue of fairness may be adjudicated.
The Official Comments claim that the provisions in New BCA section 8.60 "are similar to those in [section] 41 of the existing Model Act
and [section] 144 of the Delaware Act" and "identical" to the provisions
in the ABA Exposure Draft. In other words, the change in Illinois policy
made by New BCA section 8.60 is supposedly in line with those examples, but that justification is only partially correct. It is true that ABA
Exposure Draft section 8.31 retains the common law requirement of a
court determination of fairness, as does New BCA section 8.60. It is not
true that New BCA section 8.60 is similar to the existing Model Business
Corporation Act section 41 or Delaware General Corporation Law section 144. Both the existing Model Act and the Delaware Law, if literally
applied, make approval by the shareholders or by the disinterested directors an alternative to proving fairness, although not all courts apply the
statutory provisions literally. 61

A literal interpretation of Delaware General Corporation Law section 144, making approval by the shareholders or the disinterested directors an alternative to proving fairness, correlates well with the
indemnification provisions in section 145 of that Law which permits in61. For example, notwithstanding Delaware General Corporation Law § 144(a)(2) which allows shareholder approval without specifically excluding the vote of shares held by persons having
an interest in the transaction, in Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A. 2d 218 (Del. 1976), it was held that
fairness remained a justiciable issue, despite shareholder approval, when the majority of the shares
voting to approve were held by parties interested in the transaction.
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demnification of directors, officers, employees and agents to be authorized by directors who are not parties to the suit from which the need for
indemnification arises. New BCA section 8.75, providing for indemnification, is patterned upon Delaware General Corporation Law section
145. However, New BCA section 8.60 can be construed to permit the
fairness of a board's decision to indemnify a director under New BCA
section 8.75 to be litigated, while Delaware General Corporation Law
section 144, literally applied, would prevent such litigation. Any weakening of the statutory provisions for indemnification, as New BCA section 8.60 appears to do, should be a strong reason for corporate managers
to disfavor Illinois as a domiciliary law.
I.

DISTRIBUTIONS

New BCA Article 9 and related provisions elsewhere in the New
BCA make major changes in the Old BCA concept of corporate capital
and rules regulating distributions to shareholders. Under the Old BCA,
the corporate capital concept served two functions. First, it was the basis
for the Illinois corporate franchise tax and license fee (Old BCA sections
129, 132, 136 and 139). Second, by a set of complicated rules regulating
the use of capital for a corporation's acquisition of its own shares and for
payment of dividends and other distributions to shareholders (Old BCA
sections 6, 41, 41a, 58, 58a, 59, 60, 60a and 60b), a degree of protection
was provided to shareholders (particularly preferred shareholders) and,
incidentally, to creditors.
The New BCA continues to use corporate capital as the basis for the
Illinois corporate franchise tax and license fee (New BCA sections 15.25,
15.40, 15.55 and 15.70). However, as subsequently explained herein,
changes in the definition of corporate capital and the ways corporate capital can be reduced may permit at least some corporations to reduce their
bases for such tax and fee.
The second function of the corporate capital concept in the Old
BCA-shareholder and creditor protection-is dropped from the New
BCA. Instead, New BCA section 9.10 adopts the approach taken in the
1980 changes in the Model Business Corporation Act 62 and in ABA Exposure Draft section 6.40. This permits a corporation to pay dividends,
acquire its own shares or make other distributions 63 if, after giving effect
62. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Amendments to FinancialProvisions (pts. I & 2), 34 Bus. LAW. 1867 (1979)(proposed amendments), 35
Bus. LAW. 1365 (1980) (notice, amendments adopted).
63. New BCA § 9.10 treats a corporation's repurchase of its shares as a distribution to share-
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to the transaction, (i) the corporation would not be "insolvent" 64 and
(ii) the corporation would have "net assets ' 65 equal to not less than zero,
unless the corporation has shares with a liquidation preference, in which
case the remaining "net assets" must at least equal the total liquidation
preference.
Overall, the New BCA rules relating to distributions appear simpler
and easier to apply in the usual situation than the rules under the Old
BCA. However, for a corporation "skating close to the edge," the question of when "net assets" equal zero and what would make the corporation "insolvent" likely will be just as difficult as any question that could
arise under the Old BCA.
Further, the new rules apply, without choice, to corporations existing when the New BCA became effective and to their substantial accumulations of capital existing at that time. It remains to be seen whether
the forced change will cause material problems for any of those corporations or their shareholders. Presumably, this was investigated before the
decision was made to drop the protective features contained in the Old
BCA although the Advisory Committee's Official Comments make no
mention of such investigation. Instead, the Official Comments to New
BCA section 1.800) suggest that the protective features of the Old BCA's
corporate capital concept, including the Old BCA's regulation of the use
of capital for distributions, were dropped simply because corporations
could elect to minimize the protection by using low par value or no par
value shares. 6 6 In the same vein, the Secretary of State's Draft Comments to New BCA section 9.10 justify the change on the grounds that
the protections intended by the Old BCA could be avoided "if the shareholders wished to do so by a variety of devices." The fact that the existing rules did not work well in all cases, of course, begs the issue
holders, making a repurchase subject to the same rules as dividends. This is similar to the practice
followed by many institutional lenders in developing loan covenants to restrict such transactions.
64. According to the New BCA § 1.80(m) definition, a corporation is "insolvent" when it "is
unable to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of its business." The same definition
of "insolvent" was used in Old BCA § 2.15.
65. "Net assets" is defined in New BCA § 1.80(k) as the difference between a corporation's
"assets" and its "liabilities." In conjunction with that definition, New BCA § 9.10(d) should be read
because § 9.10(d) indicates the alternative methods for determining the amount of "net assets."
66. The Advisory Committee's rationale for eliminating the protective features of the Old BCA
is expressed in the Official Comments, supra note 9, § 1.800) as follows:
The drafters recognize that the principles once supporting the use of the terms "par value",
"stated capital", and "paid-in surplus" are no longer valid. Traditionally, those terms offered a form of protection and security to creditors and preferred shareholders. Today,
provisions based on these terms are meaningless, if not misleading, because many corporations have authorized shares with a nominal par value or without par value,
The argument, which paraphrases the argument in the official commentary on ABA Exposure Draft,
supra note 8, § 6.21, particularly at mimeo 6-24, obviously overstates the case.
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whether the protection of shareholders and creditors, particularly in preexisting situations in which the protection was being relied upon when
the New BCA became effective, should have been improved rather than
eliminated.
A detailed examination of the changes relating to capital and distributions made by the New BCA is beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief examination of some of the new provisions and their
consequences will give insight as to how extensive the changes are for
pre-existing corporations.
Under the old BCA, the capital of a corporation was the total of two
components, "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus." The total of those
two components essentially was the total of the consideration received
for the issuance of shares, less expenses of issuance, plus transfers to capital, less formal reductions in capital permitted by law (Old BCA sections
2.11, 2.12 and 19). A corporation's use of its capital to acquire its shares,
pay dividends and make other distributions to shareholders was regulated, with distinctions as to whether the capital was "paid-in surplus" or
"stated capital" (Old BCA sections 6, 41, 41a, 58, 58a, 59, 60, 60a and
60b). Related to these provisions were the concepts of par value shares
and shares without par value. The "stated capital" derived from the issuance of par value shares had to be at least equal to the par value and any
remaining consideration received for the issuance of such shares could be
assigned to "paid-in surplus" (Old BCA sections 17 and 19). For shares
without par value, no minimum consideration for their issuance was prescribed and such consideration as was received could be allocated between "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" as the board of directors
determined, unless the shares had an involuntary liquidation preference,
in which case the "stated capital" derived from those shares could not be
less than the liquidation preference (Old BCA sections 17 and 19).
1. Minimum Share Price Requirements Eliminated
As previously indicated, under Old BCA sections 17 and 19, par
value was the minimum price for which par value shares could be issued
and thus was also the minimum capital to be obtained from the issuance
of such shares. The New BCA eliminates the concept of par value so
that under New BCA section 6.25 all shares may be issued for such price
as the board of directors determines. This change applies mandatorily to
par value shares of corporations existing at the time the New BCA became effective. If such pre-existing corporations also have charter provisions defining the consequences of par value, those provisions continue to
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apply despite the statutory change, but the usual practice of pre-existing
corporations was to designate the par value of shares in their charters
without further explanation, relying upon the Old BCA to define the consequences of par value. Thus, for the typical pre-existing corporation,
the minimum price requirement for par value shares was eliminated automatically by the New BCA becoming effective.
An illustration of the foregoing would be a pre-existing corporation
with a charter that authorized common shares having a par value $100
per share, without any other provision relating to par value. If some of
the common shares were authorized but unissued on July 1, 1984, then,
to the extent holders of the outstanding shares had relied upon the $100
par value of the common shares as a degree of protection against dilution
from the issuance of the remaining authorized shares for less than $100
per share, that protection was lost when the New BCA became effective.
The authorized but unissued shares now can be issued for such price as
the board of directors determines to be proper, even if less than $100 per
share. To re-establish the minimum price requirement for the par value
shares of the pre-existing corporation, a charter amendment is needed,
67
spelling out those requirements.

In the case of no par value shares, the only minimum price requirement under the Old BCA was for shares having a preference in the event
of involuntary liquidation. Old BCA section 19(b) in effect required
those shares to be issued for a price at least equal to the liquidation preference. That requirement is eliminated by the New BCA for shares authorized before the New BCA became effective as well as for
subsequently authorized shares. Again, to restore that requirement, a
charter amendment is needed. Otherwise, existing shareholders seeking
protection against the issuance of preferred shares for a price less than
the liquidation preference will have to attack the business judgment of
the board of directors that authorizes such issuance, rather than rely
upon a statutory prohibition as was the case under Old BCA section
19(b).

67. The Official Comments, supra note 9, § 9.10 suggest that pre-existing corporations may
voluntarily continue to adhere to the Old BCA requirements for par value shares, as indicated by the
following statement: "The Advisory Committee believed the new provisions do not mean that par
value and stated capital are now illegal. They are merely not required. Any corporation currently
operating on the basis of these concepts may continue operating in that manner." Of course, voluntary compliance with the Old BCA provisions does not assure the protection intended by the Old
BCA in the same way as statutorily-required compliance.
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2.

Elimination Of Corporate CapitalAs A Reservoir Of Protection

Under the Old BCA, holders of preferred shares could look upon
the "stated capital" derived from the issuance of their preferred shares
and the common shares as a reservoir of protection because the use of
"stated capital" for distributions was restricted. That protection, of
course, was by no means perfect. However, to the extent it was relied
upon under the Old BCA, it is automatically eliminated by the New
BCA for pre-existing corporations unless their charters contain provisions spelling out such protection (which would not be typical for corporations existing under the Old BCA).
Also, under Old BCA sections 6 and 41(c), a corporation could not
use unrealized appreciation of its assets as a source for purchasing its
shares or paying dividends (other than dividends payable in shares).
Under the New BCA, the opposite is true. New BCA section 9.10(d)
expressly allows "net assets" for purposes of distributions to be based
"on a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances" as an alternative to relying upon net assets per financial stateShareholders who relied upon the Old BCA to prevent
ments.
distributions from unrealized appreciation are automatically deprived of
that protection by the New BCA becoming effective.
Those acquiring newly-issued shares by choice on or after July 1,
1984 have the opportunity to demand contracts or charter provisions if
they want corporate capital to serve as a reservoir of protection, as formerly was the case under the Old BCA. However, holders of shares already outstanding when the New BCA became effective who want to
regain that protection will have to find a way to force appropriate charter
amendments or find a basis for forcing contracts with appropriate covenants to be made with their corporations.
J.

POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN THE BASIS FOR FRANCHISE TAX AND
LICENSE FEE

As previously mentioned, the concept of corporate capital--called
"paid-in capital" in the New BCA-serves the single purpose under the
New BCA of providing the basis for the Illinois corporate franchise tax
and license fee. That fact, coupled with some deficiencies and peculiarities in the New BCA provisions concerning "paid-in capital," creates an
opportunity for at least some corporations to reduce the amounts of
franchise tax and license fee which they must pay.
Limiting the corporate capital concept to a single purpose under the
New BCA frees corporations and their advisors from the interpretive
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constraints that existed under the Old BCA. Corporate capital does not
have to be deducted in the calculation of funds legally available for distributions under the New BCA, as it did under the Old BCA. Thus, corporations and their advisors no longer will have to reckon with their own
judgments as to what is legally available for dividends and other distributions when deciding what constitutes "paid-in capital" for franchise tax
and license fee purposes.
Further, because "paid-in capital" no longer enters into the calculation of what is available for dividends and other distributions, there is no
reason to try to equate corporate capital for New BCA purposes with
capital for financial reporting purposes, as some thought there was under
the Old BCA. As hereinafter illustrated, there clearly are major differences between what constitutes capital for financial reporting purposes
and what constitutes "paid-in capital" for New BCA purposes, and in a
number of instances the latter should be a smaller amount than the former. Therefore, corporations should maintain two sets of books-one to
record capital transactions for financial reporting and one to record
"paid-in capital" as the basis for the Illinois franchise tax and license
fee-to take advantage of the divergence between the accounting requirements and the New BCA requirements.
Freed of the interpretive constraints that were inherent in the dual
purpose of corporate capital under the Old BCA, corporations that decide to be more aggressive in minimizing their Illinois franchise tax and
license fee obligations will find some interesting possibilities in the New
BCA. This involves working through the definition of "paid-in capital"
in New BCA section 1.800) and the provisions in the New BCA for
changing the amount of "paid-in capital."
Working through the New BCA "paid-in capital" provisions also
will confirm that special problems exist for corporations in existence on
July 1, 1984 when the New BCA became effective. The New BCA contains no transition rule for the initial determination of "paid-in capital"
for such pre-existing corporations. Instead, the draftsmen incorrectly assumed that the last reported total of the "stated capital" and "paid-in
surplus" under the Old BCA would equal the initial amount of "paid-in
capital" under the New BCA for each pre-existing corporation. As hereinafter discussed, pre-existing corporations for which the draftsmen's assumption is incorrect have a choice whether to attempt to reduce their
Illinois franchise tax and license fee obligations under the New BCA by
reason of such error.
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1. PeculiaritiesIn The New BCA "Paid-In Capital" Provisions
Applicable To All Corporations
Under New BCA section 1.80(j), "paid-in capital" is the result obtained from the following formula: (consideration received for issuance
of shares) - (expenses of issuance) + (shareholders' contributions to the
corporation) + (transfers to "paid-in capital" by corporate action) (distributions from "paid-in capital"). By adhering strictly to the legal
requirements, a corporation will eliminate the fourth item in the above
formula, namely, transfers to "paid-in capital" by corporate action. Further, those electing a more aggressive interpretation will use only the first
two and the last item in the formula, eliminating both shareholders' contributions to the corporation and transfers to "paid-in capital" by corporate action.
In the case of transfers to capital by corporate action (the fourth
item in the above formula), the New BCA differs from the Old BCA to
the advantage of the corporate taxpayer by allowing a choice not previously available. Although "paid-in capital," as defined in New BCA section 1.80(j), includes "any cash and other consideration . . . transferred
to paid-in capital by action of the board of directors or shareholders,"
there generally is no requirement in the New BCA that corporate transfers to capital from retained earnings or other sources be treated as
"paid-in capital." This leaves the board of directors free to transfer to a
capital account of a different name, such as "additional capital," to satisfy any accounting requirement that the transfer be reflected as an addition to capital, while avoiding an increase in "paid-in capital" for New
BCA purposes. For example, accounting practice may require the capitalization of retained earnings for the issuance of shares to pay a stock
dividend. In that regard, Old BCA section 41(e) and (f) required retained earnings (or "surplus") to be transferred to "stated capital" to
capitalize stock dividends, but no such requirement exists under New
BCA section 6.25(b) which specifies that "any such transactions shall not
require consideration. ' 68 Therefore, the transfer to capital for financial
reporting purposes should be specifically assigned by the board of directors to a capital account other than New BCA "paid-in capital" to
68. The provision in New BCA § 6.25(b) that specifies when no consideration is required for
the issuance of shares is not limited to stock dividends. It also applies to a corporation's issuance of
"its own shares in exchange for or in conversion of its outstanding shares," raising another possibility for reducing "paid-in capital" because the provision does not properly mesh with New BCA
§§ 9.05 and 9.15. That is, if a corporation issues shares in exchange for its outstanding shares, New
BCA § 6.25(b) does not require an increase in "paid-in capital" for the shares issued but under New
BCA §§ 9.05 and 9.15(a)(4), "paid-in capital" may be reduced by the amount of "paid-in capital"
attributable to the reacquired shares.
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achieve a franchise tax and license fee savings not possible under the Old
BCA.
The third item in the above formula-shareholders' contributions to
the corporation-can be construed as limited to voluntary contributions
to "paid-in capital" by reconciling the wording of New BCA section
1.800) with the apparent intent of the authors of the New BCA. The
relevant portion of section 1.800) states that "paid-in capital" includes
consideration received "in connection with the issuance of shares, plus
any cash and other consideration contributed to the corporation by or on
behalf of its shareholders or transferred to paid-in capital by action of the
board of directors or shareholders. ' 69 Taking the phrase "any cash and
other consideration contributed to the corporation by or on behalf of its
shareholders" as a complete statement of this particular item in the
formula could cause "paid-in capital" under the New BCA to be more
than what the total of "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" would have
been under the Old BCA for corporations that have recieved contributions from shareholders.
However, the apparent intent of the draftsmen of the New BCA was
not to increase the basis for the franchise tax and license fee by adopting
"paid-in capital" as a substitute for the Old BCA's "stated capital" and
"paid-in surplus." The Secretary of State's Draft Comments to New
BCA section 1.800) refer to the definition of "paid-in capital" as being
"similar to a combination of [Old BCA] stated capital and "paid-in surplus." Neither the Draft Comments nor the Advisory Committee's Official Comments to New BCA sections 15.25, 15.40, 15.55 and 15.70,
pertaining to the basis for the franchise tax and license fee, indicate any
intention to increase the basis. Instead, they describe the changes in
those sections as being only terminology changes. Under the Old BCA,
amounts contributed by shareholders could be voluntarily assigned to
"stated capital" or "paid-in surplus," but shareholders' contributions
made after the issuance of their shares generally were required to be assigned to "paid-in surplus" only if made pro rata by all the shareholders. 70 To carry out the draftsmen's apparent intent, New BCA section
1.80(j) would be construed to require inclusion in "paid-in capital" of all
pro rata contributions by shareholders, treating those as part of the consideration received in "connection with the issuance of shares," but
would include other contributions by shareholders only if voluntarily assigned to "paid-in capital."
69. New BCA § 1.80(j)(emphasis added).
70. See 1 ILL. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 22-23 (3rd ed. 1975).
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If, in the case of shareholders' contributions not made on a pro rata
basis, New BCA section 1.800) is construed so as to include in "paid-in
capital" only such amounts as are voluntarily assigned to that account,
such a voluntary step obviously will work to the disadvantage of the corporation by increasing the basis for its franchise tax and license fee. Even
though such contributions may be added to capital for financial reporting
purposes, for purposes of the New BCA they should be specifically assigned to a component of capital other than New BCA "paid-in capital"
to avoid increasing such tax and fee. While under the Old BCA the
contributing shareholder or the corporation may have wanted the contribution assigned to "stated capital" or "paid-in surplus" so as to be subject to the restrictions on use imposed by the Old BCA, the New BCA
does not restrict the use of "paid-in capital," making it pointless to assign
contributions to New BCA "paid-in capital" for that reason.
The last item in the "paid-in capital" formula in New BCA section
1.800) allows the deduction of "any distribution therefrom," but it seems
unlikely that any taxpayer advantage can be gained from this provision
which involves a drafting oversight. Taken literally, New BCA section
1.800) appears to allow a corporation to arbitrarily charge all dividends
and other distributions made pursuant to New BCA section 9. 10 as deductions from "paid-in capital." This would be consistent with the New
BCA's use of the "net assets" concept, rather than the corporate capital
concept, to regulate what may be used for distributions. However, the
wording of New BCA section 1.800) is not consistent with New BCA
sections 9.05, 9.15 and 14.25, which are the provisions under which
"paid-in capital" can be reduced for franchise tax and license fee purposes. 7' To overcome the internal inconsistency, New BCA section
1.800) should be construed as if it read "less any distributions therefrom
for which a reduction in paid-in capital is permitted and made under Section 9.05 or Sections 9.15 and 14.25 of this Act."
Another drafting inconsistency exists in that the "paid-in capital"
definition in New BCA section 1.80(j) permits reductions due to "distributions" but does not expressly provide for reductions in "paid-in capi71. New BCA § 9.15(b) refers only to the distributions and other events specified in New BCA
§ 9.15(a) as permitted reductions in "paid-in capital" and states that such reductions are not effective to "change the basis for the annual franchise tax payable by the corporation" until a statement
complying with New BCA § 14.25 is filed. The Advisory Committee's Official Comments to § 9.15
state that "Sections 9.10 [pertaining to permitted distributions] and 9.15 [pertaining to reductions of
paid-in capital] do not overlap" and "§ 9.15 deals only with those distributions which may be
charged to paid-in capital." Thus, for example, any dividend may be paid from "paid-in capital"
under New BCA § 9.10 but, according to New BCA § 9.15, the only dividends which reduce "paidin capital" for franchise tax and license fee purposes are "dividends paid on preferred shares" and
"liquidating dividends."
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tal" permitted by New BCA sections 9.15 and 14.25 that are unrelated to
"distributions." 72 Again, it seems unlikely that any franchise tax or license fee consequence should result from the inconsistency. A reasonable way to cure the inconsistency is to read into the definition of "paidin capital" in New BCA section 1.800) the reductions unrelated to "distributions" that are permitted by New BCA sections 9.15 and 14.25.
In short, New BCA sections 1.80(j), 9.05, 9.15 and 14.25 can be
construed to allow the "paid-in capital" of a corporation to be the total
consideration received for the issuance of its shares, less expenses of issuance and less formal reductions made pursuant to sections 9.05, 9.15 and
14.25. The remaining components of the New BCA section 1.80(j) definition of "paid-in capital"--contributions to "paid-in capital" by shareholders and transfers to "paid-in capital" by corporate action that
involve voluntary, disadvantageous steps--can be avoided simply by assigning such contributions and transfers to a capital account having a
name other than "paid-in capital."
In addition to avoiding voluntary contributions or transfers to
"paid-in capital," interesting possibilities for reducing the basis for a corporation's franchise tax and license fee derive from New BCA section
9.15. That section specifies the grounds for formal reductions in "paid-in
capital." The grounds listed are the same five grounds for reducing
"paid-in surplus" under Old BCA section 60a, adjusted as to language to
reflect the "paid-in capital" concept in the New BCA which replaces the
Old BCA's "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" concepts. However,
the draftsmen appear to have overlooked the fact that the five grounds
under Old BCA section 60a interrelated with other provisions in the Old
BCA which have been eliminated in the New BCA so that different results may occur from at least some of the five grounds in the context of
the New BCA.
For example, New BCA section 9.15(a)(2) permits "paid-in capital"
to be reduced by a charge for "dividends paid on preferred shares out of
paid-in capital as permitted by law". 73 The Old BCA counterpart is
clause (2) in section 60a which had a similar provision for reducing
"paid-in surplus" that interrelated with Old BCA section 41(b). Section
41(b) allowed dividends to be paid on preferred shares only from that
part of total corporate capital which constituted "paid-in surplus." Old
72. This drafting inconsistency would have been avoided by conforming more closely to the
Old BCA. The definitions of both "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" in Old BCA §§ 2.11 and
2.12 allowed deductions for "such formal reductions . . . as may have been effected in a manner
permitted by law."
73. New BCA, § 9.15(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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BCA section 41(b) is eliminated in the New BCA; the New BCA permits
dividends on any shares from any source so long as net assets are not
reduced below zero (or below the amount of the liquidation preference of
outstanding shares if the corporation has shares with such a preference)
and so long as the corporation is not rendered insolvent. Within those
limits, under the New BCA the board of directors appears to be able to
charge all dividends on preferred stock to "paid-in capital" until the entire "paid-in capital" is exhausted, whereas under the Old BCA only the
"paid-in surplus" portion of total capital could be exhausted. While such
a dividend may be treated as paid from retained earnings for financial
reporting purposes, that should not prevent charging the dividends to
"paid-in capital" for New BCA purposes. As previously mentioned,
under the New BCA there should be a separate accounting for "paid-in
capital" in accordance with, and for the limited purpose of determining
the basis for the Illinois corporate franchise tax and license fee as intended by, the provisions of the New BCA.
A reduction in "paid-in capital" to the point of exhausting that account for dividends paid on preferred shares is only one of the possibilities for reducing the basis for the franchise tax and license fee. Charging
a "deficit" to "paid-in capital" under New BCA section 9.15(a)(1) may
be another possibility. Each corporation should carefully study New
BCA sections 9.05 and 9.15, and the related provisions in section 14.25,
to determine ways in which its franchise tax and license fee might be
reduced.74 Obviously, however, those who rely upon the draftsmen's intent to avoid adding to "paid-in capital" all shareholders' contributions
should recognize the inconsistency of ignoring the draftsmen's intent by
relying upon a literal interpretation of the New BCA in other instances
to achieve a reduction in the amount of "paid-in capital."

74. Corporations that redeem or purchase their shares should be vigilant about reducing "paidin capital" in connection with those transactions. Under New BCA § 9.05, those shares automatically revert to authorized but unissued shares unless their reissue is prohibited, in which latter case
the shares are cancelled and a § 9.05 filing should be made with the Illinois Secretary of State to
reduce authorized shares by a like amount. If such a filing is made, "paid-in capital" is reduced by
the amount of "paid-in capital" represented by the cancelled shares. New BCA § 9.05(c). However,
if the reissue of shares redeemed or purchased is not prohibited so that they revert to authorized but
unissued shares, "paid-in capital" represented by such shares may be reduced only pursuant to New
BCA § 9.15 by a filing conforming to the requirements of New BCA § 14.25. In either event, the
"paid-in capital" reduction is equal to the amount of "paid-in capital" represented by the reacquired
shares even if that exceeds the amount paid by the corporation to acquire the shares. Corporations
would be well advised to check with counsel each time they acquire their own shares, and again
before filing their annual reports, to determine what changes in "paid-in capital" should be made
pursuant to New BCA §§ 9.05, 9.15 and 14.25, which then could be reflected in their annual reports.
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2. Special Problems For Pre-Existing Corporations Under The New
BCA "Paid-In Capital" Definition
Under the Old BCA, a corporation's Illinois franchise tax and license fee were based on the total of its "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" (or the portion thereof allocated to Illinois in the case of a foreign
corporation and in the case of the franchise tax for an Illinois corporation). Although badly needed, there is no provision in the New BCA for
the transition by corporations already in existence on July 1, 1984 from
the Old BCA's basis to the New BCA's "paid-in capital" basis and the
Official Comments do not offer any guidance.
The absence of a provision in the New BCA for a transition filing by
a pre-existing corporation to initially establish the amount of its "paid-in
capital" is evidence of the assumption by the draftsmen that for such a
corporation, the total of its "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" last
reported under the Old BCA will be the initial amount of its "paid-in
capital" for purposes of the New BCA. The assumption clearly is erroneous for at least some pre-existing corporations, as illustrated by the
following simple example. Under the Old BCA sections 2.11 and 2.12
definitions, expenses of issuing shares could not be deducted from "stated
capital" but could be deducted from "paid-in surplus." If corporation
"X" issued 1,000 shares with a par value of $100 each for a total consideration of $100,000 and incurred $10,000 of issuance expenses, its "stated
capital" under the Old BCA was $100,000 and its "paid-in surplus" was
zero, for a total of $100,000. Under New BCA section 1.80(j), expenses
of issuance are deducted in calculating "paid-in capital." Consequently,
corporation "X" should have an initial "paid-in capital" under the New
BCA of $90,000 as opposed to the $100,000 basis for franchise tax and
license fee purposes under the Old BCA.
Each pre-existing corporation needs to make an initial determination and report of its "paid-in capital" under the New BCA. For many
corporations this likely will occur in the first annual report filed under
the New BCA. The annual report technically is not the proper instrument for reporting changes in "paid-in capital" (see New BCA sections
14.20 and 14.25). However, in the absence of a special provision for an
initial report by a pre-existing corporation, New BCA section 14.05(j)
can be read to allow such a corporation to use the annual report to report
the initial amount of its "paid-in capital" even though different from the
amount of its capital last reported under the Old BCA. An alternative
would be for the Secretary of State to allow the initial amount to be re-
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ported under New BCA section 14.25 (technically intended for reports of
changes within 60 days of the event).
Some pre-existing corporations-likely those with a simple history
of transactions affecting their capital accounts-will find that the total of
their "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" last reported under the Old
BCA in fact equals their "paid-in capital" under the New BCA. Others
with a more complicated history of transactions affecting their capital
accounts will find that their "paid-in capital," as defined in New BCA
section 1.80(), is different from the total of their "stated capital" and
"paid-in surplus" under the Old BCA. Those latter corporations either
may acquiesce to the error of the draftsmen of the New BCA by treating
the Old BCA total as their initial New BCA "paid-in capital" or may be
aggressive in trying to establish the lower franchise tax and license fee
basis which the New BCA appears to permit.
Those that elect the aggressive approach will find a number of possibilities. The examples already cited relating to the deduction of expenses of issuance of shares and the deduction of all dividends paid on
preferred shares are possibilities for pre-existing corporations that have
those factual situations. Other examples in making the first-time determination of "paid-in capital" may involve the question whether contributions or transfers to "stated capital" or "paid-in surplus" under the Old
BCA can be excluded from "paid-in capital" by a literal interpretation of
New BCA section 1.80(j). In that regard, section 1.80(j) includes in
"paid-in capital" those amounts that have been "transferred to paid-in
capital by action of the board of directors" (emphasis added). However,
"paid-in capital" is a new concept existing only since July 1, 1984. Prior
to July 1, 1984, such transfers would have been to "stated capital" or
"paid-in surplus" (e.g., transfers to "stated capital" under Old BCA section 41(e) or (f)to capitalize a stock dividend), not to "paid-in capital."
May a pre-existing corporation omit such transfers in the calculation of
its initial "paid-in capital"?
Taking an aggressive approach will raise the question whether the
Secretary of State will refuse to honor an amount of initial "paid-in capital" for a pre-existing corporation that is less than the total of the corporation's "stated capital" and "paid-in surplus" last reported under the
Old BCA. If rejected, what would be the legal authority for that position? If rejected, will the Secretary of State in the alternative accept the
filing of a New BCA section 14.25 report of changes in "paid-in capital"
relating to pre-July 1, 1984 events (even though the filing is supposed to
be made within 60 days after the events causing the changes) if made to
adjust the total of the pre-existing corporation's Old BCA "stated capi-
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tal" and "paid-in surplus" to the New BCA section 1.800) "paid-in capital" definition? If not, how does the "paid-in capital" definition work for
pre-existing corporations?
More to the point, the fact that these questions exist indicates the
need for legislated repairs.
K.

AMENDMENTS

1. CharterAmendments
New BCA Article 10 makes a number of changes in the Old BCA
charter amendment provisions to add flexibility. These improvements
are coupled with editorial streamlining that deletes the considerable detail as to permitted amendments that was set forth in Old BCA sections
52-52.19. As discussed below, such deletion may have the inadvertent
consequence of reviving issues as to vested rights of shareholders that
had been put to rest by Old BCA sections 52-52.19. Further, in another
instance discussed below, the failure to correlate terminology with other
parts of the New BCA creates a question of interpretation that should
have been avoided.
Perhaps the most significant change, in terms of added flexibility, is
New BCA section 10.20(d) which permits the statutory two-thirds minimum vote requirement for shareholders' approval of charter amendments to be superseded by a charter provision fixing a smaller (not less
than a majority) or larger vote. A number of other changes provide additional flexibility. For example, New BCA section 10.05(b), for which
there was no counterpart in the Old BCA, permits a corporation with a
limited period of duration that has expired to revive itself within five
years by an appropriate amendment. 75 New BCA section 10.15, for
which there was no counterpart in the Old BCA, permits certain kinds of
charter amendments to be made by the board of directors without shareholders' approval. Subsection (f) of New BCA section 10.15 provides the
convenience (not granted by the Old BCA) of allowing the board of directors to restate amended articles of incorporation without shareholders' approval when no additional amendments are made by the
restatement.

76

75. The revival power is only for a corporation that improperly continues business after its
period of duration expires inasmuch as New BCA § 10.30(a)(10)(iii) requires the reviving corporation to certify that it "has been in continuous operation since before the date of expiration." Revival
validates corporate acts taken during the expiration interval but also restores all "obligations" (for
franchise taxes, etc.) during that period. New BCA, § 10.35(b).
76. If the charter is amended by the restatement, the restatement could be done under New
BCA § 10.20 which requires shareholders' approval.
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Also without counterpart in the Old BCA is New BCA section
10.10 which allows the board of directors, or, if the initial directors were
not named in the articles of incorporation and have not been elected,
then the incorporators, to amend the charter if the "corporation has not
issued shares." However, does New BCA section 10.10 apply if the corporation has preorganization subscribers but has not in fact issued any
shares? Under New BCA section 6.20, preorganization subscribers are
"deemed to be the shareholders" once the corporation's charter is accepted for filing by the Secretary of State. While the wording of New
BCA section 10.10 ("issued shares") does not mesh precisely with that of
New BCA section 6.20 ("subscribers . . . deemed to be the sharehold-

ers"), the safe interpretation is to assume that New BCA section 10.10 is
inapplicable where there are preorganization subscribers even though the
77
subscribed shares have not in fact been issued.
The potential for a more serious interpretation problem exists under
New BCA section 10.05 as a result of editorial streamlining, rather than
any attempt to add flexibility. New BCA section 10.05(a) carries forward the general authorization from Old BCA section 52 which allows
charter amendments if the amended provisions lawfully could be included in an original charter at the time of the amendment. However, as
part of the streamlining, New BCA section 10.05(a) omits other provisions that were in Old BCA section 52, as well as the provisions in Old
BCA sections 52.1-52.19, that listed specific examples of permitted charter amendments, including those which effected changes in, or exchanges, reclassifications or cancellations of, outstanding shares. The
Advisory Committee thought such provisions to be "unnecessary" and,
accordingly, omitted them from New BCA section 10.05.78
The editorial streamlining in New BCA section 10.05 is similar to
the approach taken in ABA Exposure Draft section 10.01, with one important exception. The charter amendment provisions in existing Model
Business Corporation Act section 58 are similar to those in the Old BCA
and include a list of permitted amendments similar to Old BCA sections
52.1-52.19. That list is deleted from ABA Exposure Draft section 10.01,
77. Not having "issued" shares is also a condition to voluntary dissolution by action of the
incorporators or directors under New BCA § 12.05. In that context, "issued" more clearly means
the issuance of stock certificates inasmuch as that section also requires the refunding of amounts
"actually paid in on the subscriptions." New BCA, § 12.05 (d). This also was believed to be the
meaning of "issued" in Old BCA § 74 which was the counterpart of New BCA § 12.05. 1 ILL. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. 451 (3rd ed. 1975). The fact that a question existed as to the meaning of "issued"
under Old BCA § 74 should have prompted the use of an appropriate clarifying phrase in conjunction with the use of the word "issued" in both New BCA §§ 10.10 and 12.05.
78. See Official Comments, supra note 9, § 10.05.

ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT

but the draftsmen recognized in their comments on that section that the
deleted list "was designed to eliminate the last possible vestige of the
'vested rights' theory by expressly referring to and validating all types of
amendments to which a vested rights challenge could be made."' 79 ABA
Exposure Draft section 10.01(b) makes the deleted list unnecessary by
specifying that a "shareholder . . .does not have a vested or property
right resulting from any provision in the articles of incorporation." No
similar provision is included in the New BCA.
Clearly, the Advisory Committee did not intend a substantive
change by omitting from New BCA section 10.05 the list of permitted
amendments that was found in Old BCA sections 52.1-52.19. The Official Comments to New BCA section 10.05 assure that the omission "will
not diminish any rights of a corporation to amend its articles," providing
another instance of attempting to carry forward the substance of provisions in the Old BCA by omitting them from the New BCA. Whether
the courts will accept the omission, and the Advisory Committee's expression of intent, as a substitute for a statutory provision expressly negating shareholders' vested rights, remains to be seen. In that regard, the
language of New BCA section 10.05 is not supportive of the draftsmen's
intention. The permission in section 10.05 to make amendments if the
amended provision could be included in original articles of incorporation, literally applied, does not cover amendments that exchange or cancel outstanding shares because such provisions, by their nature, would
not be included in original articles of incorporation.
2.

Class Voting

New BCA section 10.25 expands the instances in which voting by
class or series of shares applies to charter amendments. It also creates an
ambiguity as to the voting rights of nonvoting shares.
New BCA section 10.25 provides for class or series voting on charter amendments in two instances not found in Old BCA section 54. One
instance is in clause (j) of New BCA section 10.25 which adds class or
series voting if the amendment will limit or deny the voting rights of the
class or series. When the ability to limit or deny voting rights was introduced into the Old BCA by the 1981 amendments, this change was not
made and clause (j) corrects that oversight. The second and more important expansion of class or series voting is in New BCA section 10.25(g).
While Old BCA section 54(h) provided for class or series voting on
amendments which created a class of shares with "prior and superior"
79. ABA Exposure Draft, supra note 8, at mimeo 10-4.
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rights and preferences, New BCA section 10.25(g) adds class or series
voting if the rights and preferences of the new class would be no more
than "substantially equal" to those of an existing class or series of shares.
In addition to expanding the instances in which class or series voting
applies, New BCA section 10.25 is ambiguous as to whether nonvoting
shares have class voting rights for charter amendments pertaining to
such shares. Both Delaware General Corporation Law section 242(b)(2)
and ABA Exposure Draft section 10.04(d) specify that nonvoting shares
have such rights; New BCA section 10.25 does not. The lead-in language
in New BCA section 10.25 granting class voting rights ("holders of the
outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class") is copied
verbatim from Old BCA section 54. The Old BCA language, however,
was written when all shares had to have voting rights and was not
changed when the 1981 amendments for the first time provided for
shares with limited or no voting rights.
The conservative interpretation of New BCA section 10.25 would be
to read it as giving class voting rights to nonvoting shares. However, the
question becomes more difficult when carried back to New BCA section
10.20 where subsections (c) and (d), containing the general provisions for
shareholders' approval of a charter amendment, require (in addition to
the class vote) approval by the required vote of the "total outstanding
shares entitled to vote on such amendment." If nonvoting shares have
class voting rights under New BCA section 10.25, do they also constitute
"shares entitled to vote" on an amendment for New BCA section 10.20
purposes? Take, for example, a corporation with 100 voting common
shares and 100 nonvoting preferred shares that wants to amend its charter to increase the authorized number of preferred shares. Assume that
New BCA section 10.25(a) requires approval of the amendment by a
class vote of the nonvoting preferred shares. If the corporation has a
charter that requires only a majority vote, and if the vote is 51 preferred
shares and 50 common shares for the amendment, is the amendment
passed? The conservative (safe?) interpretation is that it did not pass;
that the preferred shares are not "shares entitled to vote on such amendment" for purposes of New BCA section 10.20(c) and (d). Care in drafting the provisions, however, would have eliminated the question.
The class voting requirements of the New BCA (as was true of the
Old BCA) will be one of the reasons why corporate managers will continue to prefer the Delaware General Corporation Law. Under Delaware
General Corporation Law section 242(b)(2), by an appropriate charter
provision, class voting can be avoided for an amendment which increases
or decreases the authorized number of shares of the class. Under New
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BCA section 10.25(a), class voting on such an amendment cannot be
avoided. Further, under Delaware General Corporation Law section
242(b)(2), except for changes in par value, the only other charter amendments for which class voting is statutorily required are those changing
the "powers, preferences, or special rights" of the class "so as to affect
them adversely." Creation of a class of shares having superior or equal
rights would not require class voting under the Delaware Law, but does
under the New BCA. Corporate managers who want to avoid the bargaining power that a class of shares has when class voting rights apply
clearly will opt for the Delaware Law.
L.

MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION-DISSENTERS'

RIGHTS

1. Acquisition/Sale Transactions
While the title of New BCA Article 11 mentions only mergers and
consolidations, the Article in fact covers all types of corporate acquisition/sale transactions-mergers, consolidations, share exchanges and
sales, leases or exchanges of assets. The major changes from the Old
BCA are as follows:
1. The kinds of consideration that may be exchanged for a constituent's shares in a merger are expanded and, for the first time, "cashout" mergers are permitted (New BCA section 11.05(c)).
2. A procedure for a mandatory exchange of shares is added for the
first time as an acquisition/sale technique (New BCA section 11.10).
3. The two-thirds minimum vote required by statute for shareholders' approval of corporate acquisition/sale transactions may be superseded by a charter provision requiring a smaller (not less than
majority) or larger vote (New BCA sections 11.20(b) and 11.60(e)).
4. A merger or exchange of shares need not be approved by the
shareholders of the surviving corporation or the issuing corporation, as
the case may be, if its charter is not amended by the plan of merger or
exchange, its shares outstanding immediately prior to the transaction
remain outstanding without change immediately after the transaction,
and its common shares issued in the merger or exchange (or issuable
upon conversion of securities issued in such transaction) do not exceed
20% of the common shares outstanding immediately prior to the
transaction (New BCA section 11.20(c)).
5. The ownership by a parent corporation of its subsidiary's shares
required for the merger of the subsidiary into the parent or another
subsidiary without approval of the shareholders of either the parent or
the subsidiary is lowered from 99% to 90% (New BCA section 11.30).
6. A plan of merger, consolidation or exchange of shares may provide for a delayed effective date not more than 30 days after the Secretary of State's issuance of the certificate of merger, consolidation or
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exchange80 (New BCA section 11.40).
7. The Old BCA requirement that shareholders' approval be obtained for the sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all, or substantially all, of a corporation's assets not made in the
usual course of business is changed to eliminate the need for such approval in the case of a mortgage or pledge (New BCA section 11.60).81
While the foregoing changes, overall, provide more flexibility than
the Old BCA, in some instances unnecessary limitations are retained or
the provisions are inconsistent with other provisions in the New BCA.
Examples of this are discussed below.
First, permitted merger consideration still is not completely modernized. Under Old BCA section 61(c), shares of a merging corporation
could only be converted into "shares, obligations or other securities" of
the surviving corporation or of another corporation which immediately
before or after the merger was the owner of all of the outstanding voting
securities of the surviving corporation. New BCA section 11.05(c) carries forward that formula but adds to it "cash or other property, or...
any combination of the foregoing." While this greatly expands the
formula and clearly permits "cash-out" mergers that were not permitted
under the Old BCA, New BCA section 11.05(c) still is not adequately
modernized. By retaining the Old BCA formula that limited "shares,
obligations or other securities" to those of the surviving corporation or of
a 100% owner of the voting securities of the surviving corporation, the
added words "or other property" probably should not be construed to
include "shares, obligations or other securities" of any other corporation.
80. While Illinois adds a provision for delaying the effective date, which has been permitted for
some time under Delaware General Corporation Law § 103(d), the Delaware Law recently was
amended to allow a precise time for effectiveness on either the filing date or the delayed effective
date. This allows control of the sequence of events on the effective date for complex transactions.
The New BCA has no counterpart to that Delaware provision.
81. The elimination of the long-standing requirement of shareholders' approval of mortgages or
pledges of substantially all of a corporation's assets made otherwise than in the usual course of
business depends heavily upon the statement of intent in the Advisory Committee's Official Comments, supra note 9. First, New BCA § 11.55 copies the language of Old BCA § 71, specifically
empowering the board of directors, without shareholders' approval, to authorize a "sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition" of assets in the usual course of business. Then New
BCA § 11.60, pertaining to such transactions not made in the usual course of business, copies similar
wording from Old BCA § 72 except that the words "mortgage, pledge" are deleted. The Official
Comments to section 11.60 disclose that the deletion is intended to dispense with the shareholders'
approval requirement for mortgages or pledges not made in the usual course of business. However, a
reader who does not refer to the Official Comments might assume that the phrase "or other disposition" in section 11.60 applies to mortgages and pledges since under section 11.55 a mortgage or
pledge is expressly made a type of "disposition" and the only express authority of the board to
authorize mortgages or pledges without shareholders' approval is under section 11.55 which pertains
only to dispositions in the usual course of business. The foregoing should be compared to the better
method of achieving the same result employed in ABA Exposure Draft, supra note 8, § 12.01, which
expressly provides that a mortgage or pledge does not require shareholders' approval, "whether or
not in the usual and regular course of business."
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Thus, New BCA section 11.05(c) is far more limited than Delaware General Corporation Law section 25 1(b) which allows a constituent corporation's shares to be converted into "shares or other securities" of the
surviving corporation or into "cash, property, rights or securities of any
other corporation."'8 2 Similar to the Delaware provision, and in sharp
contrast to the New BCA provision, is ABA Exposure Draft section
11.01 (b)(3).
Second, the share exchange provisions unduly restrict the consideration that may be issued for exchanged shares. The share exchange provisions in ABA Exposure Draft section 11.02(b)(3) allow an exchange for
"shares, obligations, or other securities of the acquiring or any other corporation or for cash or other property. ' 83 In contrast, New BCA section
11.10(c) allows an exchange to be made only for "shares, obligations, or
other securities of the acquiring corporation or for cash or other property",8 4 i.e., arguably excluding the use of shares, obligations or other
securities of all but the acquiring corporation. It may be, as pointed out
in the Advisory Committee's Official Comments to section 11.10, that
federal income tax and securities laws considerations will limit the use of
statutory share exchanges, but that should not be a reason for limiting
the types of consideration permitted to be paid for exchanged shares so as
to be even more restricted than for mergers.85
Third, restrictions in the subsidiary merger provisions are inconsistent with other changes in the New BCA. Old BCA section 66a permitted mergers of subsidiaries, without approval by the constituent
corporations' shareholders, if 99% owned by the corporate parent. New
BCA section 11.30 lowers the ownership requirement to 90%, but retains
two other limitations from Old BCA section 66a, namely, (1) each merging subsidiary must be "solvent" and (2) at least 30 days before the
merger can be made effective, the plan of merger must be mailed to the
shareholders of each merging subsidiary who have not waived the mailing. Retention of the 30 days advance mailing requirement seems pointless when, as an alternative, the merger procedure requiring
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(1983) (emphasis added).
83. ABA Exposure Draft, supra note 8, § 11.02(b)(3) (emphasis added).
84. New BCA, § 11.10(c) (emphasis added).
85. If more than 20% of the common shares of the acquiring corporation are to be issued in the
share exchange, or upon conversion of securities issued in the share exchange, the acquiring corporation must have the plan of exchange approved by its shareholders. New BCA, § 11.20(c)(3). Under
ABA Exposure Draft § 11.03, only the shareholders of the corporation being acquired must approve
the plan of exchange which also is true of the exchange provisions in the Illinois insurance laws, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 73, 771 (1983). The New BCA in effect adopts the shareholder approval policies of
the New York and American Stock Exchanges even for corporations that do not have their shares
listed on either of those exchanges. See Official Comments, supra note 9, § 11.20.

82.
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shareholders' approval could be used to merge subsidiaries, in which case
the 90% shareholder could approve the merger for the subsidiaries by
written consent upon only five days' prior notice under New BCA section 7.10 (which eliminates the need for unanimity for shareholders' action by written consent). If the subsidiary is merged into the parent,
voting by the parent corporation's shareholders could be avoided under
New BCA section 11.20(c) if (as probably would be the case) no more
than 20% of the parents' common shares is issued. By the same procedure, the merger of an insolvent subsidiary into the parent could be approved. Thus, both limitations from Old BCA section 66a are
anachronisms in the New BCA. Allowing subsidiary mergers without
shareholders' approval and without other restrictions when 90% ownership exists, as is the case under Delaware General Corporation Law section 253, would have been more appropriate.
2. Dissenters' Rights
New BCA sections 11.65-11.70 contain the provisions for shareholders' dissenters' rights. Old BCA sections 66a, 70 and 73 provided
dissenters' rights in the case of mergers, consolidations and sales or exchanges not in the usual course of business of substantially all of the
corporate assets. New BCA section 11.65(a) changes that list of transactions to conform to changes elsewhere in the New BCA, such as adding
statutory share exchanges (new in the New BCA). Further, New BCA
section 11.65(a) adds dissenters' rights for charter amendments that alter
or abolish preferential rights or redemption rights of any shares or that
limit or eliminate cumulative voting for any shares of corporations existing prior to January 1, 1982.
The New BCA's dissenters' rights provisions, which are substantially more complex than those in the Old BCA, are intended to be protective of shareholders' interests. For corporate managers of public
corporations, however, dissenters' rights will continue to be a reason for
preferring the Delaware General Corporation Law. Delaware Law section 262 provides dissenters' rights only for mergers or consolidations,
rather than the more extensive list of transactions set forth in New BCA
section 11.65(a). Further, even for mergers or consolidations, dissenters'
rights are available under the Delaware Law only if certain exceptions
(principally for holders of listed securities or securities held of record by
more than 2,000 shareholders) do not apply. Unlike the Illinois law,
Delaware allows publicly-owned corporations considerable freedom from
dissenters' rights, relying upon the market place rather than statutory
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remedies to provide shareholders an alternative to the transaction to
which they dissent.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New BCA is a far more complex statute than its predecessor,
the Old BCA. The New BCA makes a number of improvements, but
also has a number of deficiencies. The July 1, 1984 effectiveness of the
New BCA mooted the question whether the needed improvements could
have been made more efficiently by discrete amendments to the Old
BCA. The task now should be to promptly correct, improve and more
adequately explain the new law, the need for which is apparent.

